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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Introductory notes 
 
The flight of Somalis and Ethiopians towards Kenya has currently been present in the 
media. One of the most pressing issues in these articles concerning refugees is the 
lack of space in Kenya‘s refugee camps and the general overwhelming of the 
government and humanitarian organizations. While the challenges that asylum 
seekers and refugees present to the host countries are widely discussed, relatively 
little concern is given to the rights of refugees once they have entered the country. 
However, this is not only true for the news, but also for policy making and legal 
responses on refugee influx – despite the fact that most refugees in Kenya have lived 
in the country for several years. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is not to analyze 
the period of flight or arrival, but to focus on the living conditions of refugees in 
Kenya.  
 
The approach the paper takes is rights-based, i.e. it will compare the rights that 
refugees are legally guaranteed to their factual situation. The thesis is based upon 
the assumption that there is a discrepancy between the rights that refugees are 
entitled to through international norms and domestic laws, and the rights that they 
can indeed enjoy in Kenya. In order to validate the hypothesis, several rights were 
chosen to compare their theoretical and practical implementation in the country.  
 
In the first section, the subject matter will be positioned in its historical and legal 
dimensions. Kenya‘s role as a refugee receiving country will be examined, with a 
focus on the historical developments that led to today‘s situation. This is considered 
vital for an understanding of the problematic of the lack of implementation, 
because it was a gradual development to restrict the rights of asylum seekers and 
refugees and to narrow down the liberties they can in fact enjoy. 
The second section forms the main part of the thesis. It concentrates on some 
selected groups of rights that were judged most important by the refugees 
interviewed. For every one of these groups, the international and national legal 
norms will be explained, before discussing in more detail the situation on the 
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ground. The aim here is to find out if a gap does indeed exist, and which rights 
violations were and are committed. Further, strategies of refugees to counteract 
the lack of legal clarity and violations will be presented shortly.  
The last part is an attempt to answer the obvious question that arises: Why is it that 
this gap exists and refugees cannot live in Kenya with all the rights that they are 
theoretically guaranteed? As it is impossible to give a full answer, some key 
elements will be examined from a legal angle.  
 
1.2. Refugees in Kenya: an overview 
 
Kenya plays an important role as a refugee receiving country in East Africa. Due to 
its relative stability and the geographic position – surrounded by countries with 
insecure regimes, sharing border with Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and 
Tanzania – it has been granting access to asylum seekers since independence. All of 
the neighbouring countries, with the exception of Tanzania, have generated 
immense forced migrations into Kenya. In 2009, the country hosted more than 
350.000 refugees, which makes it the sixth largest hosting country in the world in 
terms of the total numbers of refugees on its territory.1 The refugee population has 
increased over the last few years, mainly as a result of the continuous influx of 
asylum seekers from Somalia together with a lack of durable solutions. The security 
situation in Somalia has been deteriorating continuously, so that today Somalis 
constitute the third largest refugee group in the world – and their prime destination 
is Kenya.2 Somali refugees account for the vast majority of displaced persons in 
Kenya with about 250.000 people, followed by Ethiopians and Sudanese. Further 
countries of origin are Uganda, Rwanda and Congo-Kinshasa and, albeit less, Eritrea 
and Burundi.3  
 
Although there is a steady arrival of new asylum seekers, the majority are old cases, 
i.e. refugees that have lived in the country for many years, often decades.4 This 
phenomenon can be explained by the lack of durable solutions and the therefore 
generated protracted situation. In practice, refugees have three possible long-term 
                                                 
1 UNHCR (2010a): 2009 Global Trends. Refugees, asylum seekers, returnees, internally displaced and 
stateless people. Geneva: UNHCR.   
2 UNHCR 2010a: 9. 
3 USCRI (2010): World Refugee Survey. Kenya. 
4 UNHCR: Analysis of Refugee Protection Capacity. Kenya. April 2005. 
 3 
solutions: they either go back to their country of origin, move on to a third country 
or they can integrate in the host community of their first country of asylum. The 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) summarizes these three 
prospects as durable solutions and calls them voluntary repatriation, (third country) 
resettlement and local integration. Ideally, they are used complementary to the 
respective situations – refugees, for whom it is safe to go back, shall repatriate. For 
UNHCR and probably most refugees, and without a doubt for the host countries, this 
would be their preferred option but the security situation often hinders the return. 
Others shall receive the scarce places for resettlement available and move on to a 
third country – unfortunately, this option is not only expensive, but with the current 
political climate, there are only a few countries that accept refugees from Kenya. 
This makes third country resettlement available to only a small percentage of 
mostly better-educated refugees,5 while the majority is obliged to stay in their first 
country of asylum. Hence, for most the only option is local integration.6 
―Integration‖ is a widely discussed concept, and it is regularly instrumentalized to 
indicate that migrants or ―foreigners‖ are not willing to assimilate into ―the‖ 
society of the host country. This term must therefore be employed with caution and 
considering the implications it entails – in the context of long-term solutions for 
refugees it has been defined by UNHCR as ―the process by which the refugee is 
assimilated into the social and economic life of a new national community.‖7 As this 
definition is neither precise nor practical, other authors have tried to find better 
descriptions. For example, Bulcha contrasts integration with ―marginalisation‖8 and 
Harrell-Bond analyzes integration as ―a situation in which host and refugee 
communities are able to co-exist, sharing the same resources – both economic and 
social – with no greater mutual conflict than that which exists within the host 
community‖.9 All of these definitions can merely be an approximation to the term – 
as for the rights-based approach that this thesis takes, factors such as the right to 
                                                 
5 Kuhlman, Tom: Organized versus spontaneous settlement of refugees in Africa. In: Howard 
Adelman/John Sorenson (1994): African Refugees. Development Aid and Repatriation. Boulder: 
Westview Press: 117. 
6 UNHCR (2009a): Global Appeal 2010-2011. Finding durable solutions. Geneva: UNHCR.  
7 Kuhlman 1994: 119.  
8 Bulcha, Mekuria (1988): Flight and Integration: Causes of Mass Exodus from Ethiopia and Problems 
of Integration in the Sudan. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies: 86. 
9 Harrell-Bond, Barbara (1986): Imposing aid: Emergency relief to refugees. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 7. 
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work, to choose the place of residence and to have equal access to educational and 
medical facilities represent the option of local integration.  
 
But this option of local integration has come under threat: While the first refugees 
to arrive in independent African States were allowed to integrate locally by being 
given land, work permits and the respective nationality quite easily, along with the 
possibility for many to return,10 the last few decades have witnessed a change: 
―[T]here is hesitancy about accepting refugees for settlement and integration and 
an increased propensity to view refugees as only temporary settlers.‖11 This 
perception of refugees as being in the country for only a certain period of time is 
also true for Kenya, even though the facts do not support this idea, as some people 
have lived in the country for up to 20 years without having integrated locally.12  
For the majority of refugees in Kenya, neither resettlement nor repatriation is 
possible. As most refugees in Kenya originate from Somalia, they have no real 
possibility to return due to the ongoing conflict and civil war. Hence, the two 
options available to them are resettlement and local integration. About 5000 
refugees are resettled out of Kenya to third countries each year, mainly to North 
America. Yet this relatively large number of people is insignificant in comparison to 
the percentage of refugees that live in Kenya at the moment.13 
For Sudanese refugees, who mainly originate from Southern Sudan, voluntary 
repatriation was and is a viable option: in 2005, the Naivasha Peace Agreement was 
signed between the central government of Sudan and the rebels in the South, which 
led to a significant amelioration of the security situation in Southern Sudan.14 
Therefore, repatriation was pursued for refugees from Southern Sudan in the last 
few years. However, they are the exception that proves the rule: the majority of 
refugees have to stay in Kenya without any possibilities of leaving the country.  
―Local integration in Kenya is currently not viewed as an option for significant 
numbers of refugees and indeed is contrary to government policy.‖15 In fact, 
refugees are not only not encouraged to integrate into Kenyan society but even 
                                                 
10 Stein, Barry: Durable solutions for developing country refugees. In: International Migration 
Review, 1986, 20/74: 265.  
11 Stein 1986: 266.  
12 Interview with a refugee from Uganda, 20.07.2010 
13 UNHCR 2005: 6.  
14 Tull, Denis M.: Sudan after the Naivasha Peace Agreement. No Champagne Yet. In: Stiftung 
Wirtschaft und Politik Comments 2005, 3. 
15 UNHCR 2005 : 48.  
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hindered through limitations such as the encampment policy followed by the 
government, the difficulty or even impossibility to obtain work permits and other 
obstacles in everyday life due to their refugee status. 
Thus, the majority of refugees in Kenya live there for several years, without any 
real hope to repatriate or resettle in a third country. As a consequence, it is all the 
more important to focus on the living conditions and the rights of people living in 
Kenya as refugees. 
 
Refugees in Kenya are required to live in refugee camps.16 Few refugees have the 
official authorization to leave the camp areas to live in different parts of the 
country – however, a lot of towns in Kenya increasingly host refugees who do not, 
for various reasons, live in the designated areas. Estimates go up to 100.000 
documented and undocumented refugees in Nairobi alone.17 
 
1.3. Methodology 
 
The thesis is based on a comparison of the international and domestic legal 
framework with the factual legal situation of refugees in Kenya. It is assumed that 
there is a difference between the law in the books and the law on the ground - 
between theory and practice. In order to find that discrepancy, I analyze the rights 
relevant for the lives of asylum seekers and refugees. The methodology ―statutory 
interpretation‖ is employed in order to find out how the legal situation is supposed 
to be.18 Interpretation of legal documents is the most important methodology of 
law, as its aim is to determine the content. This method follows a clear structure 
on its process to gain knowledge. The first step is literal interpretation, which 
determines the ordinary meaning of the phrase or word at question. If this does not 
give a clear and unmistakable meaning, systematic interpretation is employed, 
which considers the context of the document. The third step is historical 
interpretation that takes into account the historical context of the norm. In case of 
remaining doubts and questions on the meaning of the norm, teleological 
interpretation is the final step, which considers the object and purpose of the 
                                                 
16 The Refugee Act. Republic of Kenya: 2006: Art. 25 lit f.   
17 Pavanello, Sara/Elhawary, Samir/Pantuliano, Sara (2010): Hidden and exposed: Urban refugees in 
Nairobi, Kenya. HPG Working Paper. London: Overseas Development Institute: 7.  
18 Jacobi, Christoph Alexander (2008): Methodenlehre und Normwirkung. Die Normwirkung als 
Maßstab der Rechtsgewinnung. Baden-Baden: Nomos: 344. 
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document.19 This method is also determined in international law: in order to 
identify the content of an international norm, firstly, the ordinary meaning is 
considered through literal interpretation, secondly the context of the text is 
considered, and finally, the object and purpose of the document are taken into 
account.20  
 
After the legal interpretation of several basic rights, I compare these rights to the 
realities of refugee lives in Kenya. Here, not only text interpretation of theoretical 
texts and research findings is used, but also the two methods of expert interviews 
and participant observation. In this case, experts are people who possess specific 
knowledge about social facts and expert interviews are the method to access this 
knowledge.21 It is not the person itself that is of interest for the interviewer, but 
the aim of the interview is to generate the knowledge that they possess. Expert 
interviews are usually non- or semi-standardized, i.e. they use a guideline of 
flexible questions depending on the interviewee.22  
 
The main findings of this paper are based on semi-structured interviews with 
several experts on the legal situation of refugees.23 The interview guideline 
consisted of five key questions that, apart from small modifications due to new 
findings, remained the same throughout the research process. The questions were 
aimed at testing and adjusting the working hypotheses. In the course of the 
interview, often new questions and follow-up questions were asked depending on 
the background of the interview partner and the emphasis they made. Nine 
interviews, which each took around one hour, were held in summer 2010 in Kenya. 
Five interviews were conducted in Nairobi between July and August and four in 
Kakuma refugee camp in September. Every interview partner except one accepted 
the use of a tape recorder.  
                                                 
19 Jacobi (2008): 344ff. 
20 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. UN: 1969: Art. 31.  
21 Gläser, Jochen/Laudel, Grit (2004): Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: 10. The original says: Experten sind „Menschen, die 
ein besonderes Wissen über soziale Sachverhalte besitzen, und Experteninterviews sind eine 
Methode, dieses Wissen zu erschließen.―  
22 Gläser/Laudel (2004): 13. 
23 Hopf, Christel: Qualitative Interviews. Ein Überblick. In: Uwe Flick/Ernst von Kardoff/Ines Steinke 
(2008): Qualitative Forschung. Hamburg: Rowohlt: 349ff.  
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The interview partners in Nairobi consisted of a lawyer working with a Kenyan 
organization for refugee rights – Kituo cha Sheria, a lawyer from UNHCR Nairobi, a 
university professor of law at Moi University, the head of the Nairobi Archdiocese 
Refugee Assistance Programme (NARAP), an organization offering self-help 
education to urban refugees since the 1980s and the District Officer of Eastleigh, a 
district in Nairobi, populated mainly by Somali immigrants and refugees. At the 
beginning of September, I received the permission to conduct research in Kakuma 
refugee camp in the northwest of Kenya, where I spent several days on research in 
and around the camp. The interviews were conducted with the Protection Officer 
of UNHCR, with a lawyer from a Kenyan NGO working on refugee rights, the 
Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK), a public officer from the Department of 
Refugee Affairs (DRA) responsible for the first registration of asylum seekers and a 
journalist from the refugee community, the editor of the Kakuma News Reflector 
(KANERE). 
As mentioned above, other than interviews, participant observations24 were used. 
Participant observation is a method of data collection during which observation is 
―carried out when the researcher is playing an established participant role in the 
scene studied.‖25 These observations were recorded in writing and later 
interpreted alongside the expert interviews.   
In Nairobi, I conducted participant observation, informal conversations and 
interviews with refugees from Somalia, Sudan, DR Congo and Uganda. Most of the 
time, I spent the day with either one or several urban refugees, visiting their 
homes, accompanying them to the DRA and UNHCR, or joining diverse daily tasks. 
Also in Kakuma, apart from the expert interviews, several conversations with aid 
agency staff and refugees were held and recorded for a better understanding of the 
situation of refugees. 
 
1.4. The legal background 
 
Before analyzing certain refugee rights in regard to their implementation and 
practice, this section provides the theoretical background of the legal situation of 
refugees and introduces the relevant international and national instruments. The 
                                                 
24 Brüsemeister, Thomas (2000): Qualitative Forschung. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.  
25 Atkinson,Paul/Hammersley, Martyn: Ethnography and participant observation. In: Norman 
Denzin/Yvonna Lincoln (1994): Handbook of qualitative research. London/New Delhi: 248. 
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international protection regime that has developed over the past decades finds 
itself in between the principle of State sovereignty and humanitarian concerns. 
Today, its importance cannot be overestimated, as national governments seem to 
focus more on their sovereignty by preventing asylum seekers from reaching their 
territory and limiting their rights to protection than on providing refugees with the 
necessary protection.26 
The basic international refugee rights are to be found in refugee and human rights 
law, namely the Refugee Convention and Protocol, the Convention of the former 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the International Bill on Human Rights. 
They are all part of international law, which has certain peculiarities compared to 
domestic law, above all its lack of enforcement mechanism. One definitional 
element of law is its enforcement through a responsible organ of the legal system. 
But the branches of international law relevant for refugee rights do not have a 
central power to address in case of the breach of an international norm. Instead, 
the consequences depend on the sanctions of States and international organisations. 
International human rights law is thus fundamentally political, as there is no court 
with universal jurisdiction which can be addressed if refugee rights are not met. In 
this case, the particular State is being punished by political sanctions.27  
 
1.4.1. International landscape for refugee law 
 
Kenya has signed and ratified the fundamental refugee Conventions and treaties, 
albeit with certain reservations. Reservations are part of the process of the making 
of an international treaty: they give contracting States the opportunity to exclude 
or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty that they do not wish to 
apply. On the one hand, it constitutes a reduction of the treaty and its scope, but 
on the other hand, it is necessary to get as many States as possible to sign.28  
Rules and provisions from international law do not automatically become part of 
Kenya‘s legal structure. Kenya ―inherited from Britain a dualist concept whereby 
                                                 
26 Goodwin-Gill, Guy (2007): The refugee in international law. Oxford: Oxford University Press: v.  
27 Darcy, James (1997): Human rights and international legal standards: what do relief workers need 
to know? Relief and Rehabilitation Network, Paper No. 19. London: Overseas Development Institute: 
13; Hafner, Gerhard et al (2008): Einführung in die internationalen Grundlagen des Rechts. 
Einführung in das Völkerrecht. Wien: Universität Wien: 9ff.  
28 Hafner et al 2008: 19.  
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international law is considered a separate and distinct system from domestic law‖.29 
In order to be applicable for Kenya, international rights have to be made part of the 
domestic legal framework – this has been done with the above mentioned treaties.30 
Therefore, all the rights guaranteed by international legal instruments and approved 
of by the State of Kenya are part of the national legislation and can be enjoyed by 
all persons in the national territory, hence including refugees.  
 
Whenever talking about refugee rights, the first instrument mentioned is the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention), which, 
together with its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, stands ―at the 
centre of the international refugee protection regime‖.31 It was designed after the 
crisis of forced migration during the Second World War in order to establish common 
standards regarding the treatment of refugees. It was the first legal instrument that 
defined the term ―refugee‖ and spelled out the rights and duties attached to it. It 
gave the contracting States guidelines on the treatment of refugees and asylum 
seekers and answered questions concerning the right to work, social security or the 
expulsion of refugees.32 The actors of the Refugee Convention are States: it is the 
host governments that are responsible for the protection of refugees on their 
territory, while the role of UNHCR is to maintain a ―watching brief‖33 – it intervenes 
when it becomes necessary to protect refugees and their rights. Kenya became a 
party of the Refugee Convention in 1966, with reservations to some provisions.34 
Today, it still remains the cornerstone of international refugee law, and has been 
the basis for many regional and national refugee rights instruments. 
 
The 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol), to which Kenya 
acceded in 1981, refers to the Refugee Convention and is seen as a complement to 
it.35 The big accomplishment of the Protocol was to universalize the ―refugee‖ 
                                                 
29 International Committee of the Red Cross: International humanitarian law. National 
implementation. Kenya. 2010. 
30 Muigua, Kariuki: Protecting refugee rights in Kenya: Utilising International Refugee Instruments, 
the Refugee Act 2006 and the Constitution of Kenya as catalysts. 2010: 70.  
31 Durieux, Jean-François/McAdam, Jane: Non-Refoulement through Time : The Case for a 
Derogation Clause to the Refugee Convention in Mass Influx Emergencies. In: International Journal 
of Refugee Law, 2004, 16/1: 5.  
32 UNHCR (2007): The 1951 Refugee Convention. Questions and Answers. Geneva: UNHCR: 4ff.  
33 UNHCR 2007: 8. 
34 Kenya maintains reservations on the Articles 8, 9, 17, 24 and 25.  
35 UNHCR 2007: 3.  
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concept so that the majority of displaced persons were no longer neglected 
protection. 
The Refugee Convention and its Protocol are universal instruments: the intention 
was to conceptualize them in order to be applicable in all countries worldwide. But 
there are also regional Conventions and treaties, designed to cover the specific 
characteristics and interests of individual regions of the world. For Africa, this aim 
was realized through the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Convention). Its basis is the Refugee Convention 
and Protocol and it explicitly refers to them in the Preamble.36 To take a step 
further, it adapts the global concepts to the African reality, where it was mostly 
masses of people fleeing political unrest and discriminatory regimes, a phenomenon 
not experienced to that extent in the West.37 
“[T]he Convention was clearly a landmark event for refugee law and policy when it 
entered the scene in 1969. Its revolutionary character lay principally in the new 
and specific concepts it brought into play.”38 These include, for example, the 
extended refugee definition and the concept of burden-sharing, which gives African 
States the possibility to directly appeal to another State in order to help them in 
case they are overwhelmed by the numbers of asylum seekers.39 
 
As mentioned above, international treaties need to be made part of domestic law in 
order to be applicable in Kenya. The Refugee Act was the first national legislation to 
do so. Talks about domestic refugee law had begun as early as the 1990s, but until 
2006, the legal system lacked the specific category of ―refugee‖. Instead of having a 
document regulating refugee rights, they were simply referred to as ―non-nationals‖ 
and subsumed under two broader aliens legislations. Therefore, the Refugee Act was 
a necessary and long-awaited step which formally integrated the UN Refugee 
Convention and the OAU Convention into Kenyan law.40 From this time on, all the 
rights laid down in the described Conventions were part of Kenyan law: “every 
                                                 
36 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. OAU: 1969. 
37 Okoth-Obbo, George: Thirty years on: a legal review of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. In: Refugee Survey Quaterly, 20/1, 
2001: 105. 
38 Okoth-Obbo 2001: 88.  
39 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa: Art. II (4). 
40 Wakahiu, Judy: An introduction to international, regional and national refugee law and 
protection: Practical challenges in international relations and globalization. Lecture by Judy 
Wakahiu at The Jesuit Hekima Peace College, Nairobi Kenya on 13th March, 2007: 10.  
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recognized refugee and every member of his family living in Kenya shall be entitled 
to the rights and duties and be subject to the obligations contained in the 
international conventions to which Kenya is party.”41  
One of the main achievements of the Act is the establishment of a Department of 
Refugee Affairs, which is in charge of administrative matters relating to refugees 
and asylum seekers. Finally, a government department has taken the responsibility 
for refugees instead of relying on UNHCR and its partners. However, the Refugee Act 
is not implemented fully yet, but the theoretical foundation has been made. 
 
1.4.2. Who is a ―refugee‖? 
 
We come across the terms ―refugee‖ and ―asylum seeker‖ on a nearly daily basis, as 
they are frequently employed on the news or in papers, sometimes without further 
reflection. As this thesis writes about refugee rights and the title itself contains the 
word refugee, it is inevitable to take a closer look at this term before using it. In 
this chapter, a legal approach is taken in order to find a suitable definition, the 
contextualisation of the term will be examined in chapter 3.1.  
 
It was the Refugee Convention in 1951 that defined the term refugee for the first 
time in international law and this refugee definition was since then employed not 
only to define refugees internationally, but it was also adopted from many States 
into their national legislation.42   
Article 1 of the Refugee Convention applies the term refugee to the following 
persons: 
“As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing  to well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country.”43 
The problem that remains is how to interpret the main terms in this clause: ―As a 
result of its great impact, virtually every word of the core phrase of the refugee 
                                                 
41 The Refugee Act: Art. 16 (1) lit a.  
42 Steinbock, Daniel: The refugee definition as law: issues of interpretation. In: Frances 
Nicholson/Patrick Twomey (1999): Refugee Rights and Realities. Evolving International Concepts and 
Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 13.  
43 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. UN: 1951: Art. 1. 
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definition has been subject to interpretative dispute.‖44 There are no definite 
answers on how to interpret ―race‖, ―well-founded fear‖ or ―membership of a 
particular social group‖. 
One of the debates concerning the Convention‘s definition of ―refugee‖ is whether 
the term is only applicable for individuals or also for group situations. Normally, 
each asylum seeker shall be processed individually before their refugee status will 
be determined. However, in Kenya, as in most African countries today, forced 
migrants often arrive in large numbers, which makes individual determination 
administratively difficult if not impossible. To answer this question, there are 
different opinions: while some argue that the refugee definition does not apply to 
refugee determination on a group basis, but only to individuals and therefore has 
little relevance for African refugees today,45 others claim that the individual 
character of the definition does not exclude group situations.46 Whenever there is a 
debate about the meaning of a legal document, the method of interpretation is used 
in order to identify the objective content and the intended meaning of the 
contracting partners or legislator. For legal interpretation, different steps have to 
be taken and a distinctive feature for international law is the use of the travaux 
préparatoires. These preparatory works are drafts of the treaty and protocols of the 
meetings. Only in case questions still remain, historical interpretation through the 
travaux préparatoires is taken into consideration.47 In case of determining the 
refugee status on a group basis, these historical documents support the latter point 
of view that the status may be granted in group situations.  
 
The Protocol from 1967 refers to the Refugee Convention and is seen as a 
complement to it. It has widened the definition of a refugee – this extension of the 
Refugee Convention was a necessary step that UNHCR and a number of recently 
decolonized States had been lobbying for, as the Convention contains a time and 
space limit: only people who had fled their countries before 1951 in Europe fell 
under the scope of the Convention.48 Before this amelioration, the majority of 
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people fleeing their country of origin for the reasons stated in the Refugee 
Convention did not fall under the term ―refugee‖ and were therefore not eligible 
for protection. The Protocol explicitly adopts the definition of the Refugee 
Convention, by eliminating the following parts: ―As a result of events occurring 
before 1 January 1951‖ and geographical limitations.  
When designing the Protocol, it was agreed upon that a change of the definition was 
needed, but the extent of it was widely discussed. The removal of time and 
geographical limitations was important, but not enough for some authors: ―A 
problem remains with the refugee definition as its focus on political persecution has 
been at the cost of assisting and protecting larger numbers of people fleeing 
generalized situations of violence and abuse.‖49 
 
The term ―refugee‖ was further broadened in 1969 by the OAU Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees Problems in Africa, to which Kenya 
became a party in 1992.50 The most celebrated feature of the OAU Convention was 
the so-called ―expanded‖ refugee definition, which was influenced by a debate on 
colonial and minority-rule territories. As the definition provided by the UN in its 
Convention and Protocol did not cover the predominant situation in Africa of people 
fleeing from civil wars and abuse of human rights, these people were not considered 
refugees and therefore lacked assistance.51  
In the first paragraph of Article 1 of the OAU Convention, the term ―refugee‖ is 
defined by exactly the same wording as it is to be found in the Refugee Convention. 
The second paragraph goes on as follows: 
 ―The term „Refugee‟ shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public 
order in either part of the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is 
compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality.” 
 
The Kenyan Refugee Act of 2006 also refers to the UN Refugee Convention, the 
Protocol and the OAU Convention and adopts their definitions. Concerning the term 
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―refugee‖, this Act on the one hand englobes the meaning of ―statutory refugee‖ 
combined with the prevalent definition, and on the other hand it introduces a new 
concept on refugees, called prima facie refugee. This will be discussed in length 
later, in chapter 4. 
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2. The historical background 
 
This chapter examines the evolution of asylum in Africa in the post-independence 
era in order to embed the legal situation of refugees in its historical context. As 
Kenya is not unique in the way asylum policies were developed, this chapter 
considers the main factors leading to the situation of asylum seekers in the whole 
of Sub-Saharan Africa before taking a deeper look at the development of the 
treatment of refugees in Kenya. 
 
2.1. Asylum in Africa 
 
Most States in Africa have long served as model countries concerning asylum and 
the commitment to protection and durable solutions for refugees. It is argued that 
there are two main periods regarding refugee policies in post-independence Africa: 
during the first period there was an era of openness towards forced migrants, even 
described as a ―golden age‖ of asylum in Africa, while the second marked a shift in 
the nature of asylum with more restrictions imposed and a less generous attitude.52  
 
During the first period, this is to say after colonialism until the late 1980s, many 
African States were characterized by similar features regarding the situation of 
refugees. These include: a liberal refugee definition, a commitment to asylum and 
the principle of non-refoulement, the effort to find durable solutions and a general 
respect for refugee rights.53  
During this time, the majority of forced migrants came from countries still fighting 
against colonialism or racist regimes, like apartheid South Africa. Therefore, the 
OAU used an extended definition of ―refugee‖ in its Convention,54 in order to 
include these migrants and entitle them to protection.55 With the help of this 
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newly established and improved legal standard, African countries were very 
generous in receiving forced migrants and in granting asylum.56 
The principles of asylum and non-refoulement, the prohibition to send back asylum 
seekers, were mostly respected, with some exceptions such as the expulsion of 
Rwandan refugees from Uganda.57  
Resettlement to third countries, together with the possibility to integrate locally, 
provided a good basis for durable solutions. From the 1970s onwards, Tanzania, 
often cited as a good example for the African hospitality towards refugees, offered 
naturalization and even land to refugees.58 As for refugee rights such as the 
freedom of movement, the rights to work, education and security rights, they were 
in general upheld and respected.59  
 
This openness of the receiving governments and also host communities towards 
refugees had different reasons. While some authors explain it by the ―traditional 
hospitality‖ of African societies,60 this explanation is rejected by others and 
considered as oversimplified.61 Another explanation takes into account the specific 
nature of the refugees of that time: most came from independence or anti-
apartheid struggles and were seen as freedom fighters, which – together with the 
ideologies of that time being anti-colonialism and pan-Africanism – provided the 
basis for an open approach towards asylum seekers.  
Furthermore, many governments offered to resettle refugees in their countries. 
The OAU Convention includes a provision for inter-African burden sharing62: as the 
majority of refugees were found in Southern Africa, the Great Lakes region and at 
the Horn of Africa, some countries dealt with very high numbers of refugees, while 
others witnessed little or no influx. This led to an uneven distribution of the 
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responsibility for refugees, which tried to be counteracted through resettlement to 
third countries where there were fewer refugees.63 
 
The 1980s and early 1990s marked a shift in the asylum practices of many countries 
in that the institution of asylum declined. In practice, this meant a retreat from 
the openness towards refugees: instead of granting asylum, it was now often 
preferred to create so-called ―safe zones‖ in the country of origin in order to 
prevent the income of refugees.64 Especially during the refugee crisis after the 
Rwanda genocide, zones under the protection of the United Nations were 
established for civilians in order to make them stay in Rwanda. The construction of 
―safe zones‖ was, and still is, highly controversial and stands on dubious legal 
grounds.65 
Furthermore, one of the main principles in refugee protection was breached by the 
expulsion of refugees and rejection at the border. Both increased since the early 
1990s, when refugees in several countries had to return to their countries of origin 
before it was secure enough for them to return. There were incidents of whole 
buses packed with foreigners who were being deported back to their respective 
country.66 This meant a step backwards away from durable solutions such as 
resettlement in a third country or local integration and towards a focus on 
repatriation at the earliest moment. 
The increase of restrictive policies was also reflected in the standard of treatment: 
the rights to work and education were limited and the possibilities to obtain land 
were often abolished.67 The reasons for this change of attitude and treatment of 
refugees in Africa include different factors. One is a major increase in numbers: 
while during the first decades after independence, moderate flows of refugees 
arrived in the countries of asylum, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed unexpected and 
larger groups of forced migrants seeking asylum. Different emergency situations 
that generated refugee flows coincided, such as the Great Lakes refugee crisis.  
Over two million Rwandan asylum seekers fled to neighbouring countries within a 
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few weeks – the situation peaked in April 1994 when around 250.000 people fled to 
Tanzania in only one day.68 This has not been witnessed before, and the receiving 
countries were overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of refugees. As a result, most 
countries turned towards the above mentioned measures: border closure, expulsion 
and restrictive policies.  
Another possible explanation lies in the different nature of refugees: it was no 
longer people fleeing repressive colonialist or racist regimes, but asylum seekers 
began to come from independent countries. This led to the question of inter-State 
relations, as some host countries were careful not to disturb the diplomatic 
relationships with the countries of origin by taking in their nationals as refugees. 
 
Another aspect of this period was a growth in xenophobia, which led to a 
predominantly negative attitude towards refugees in some of the host 
communities.69 An interesting observation here is the concurrence of the growing 
xenophobia and the democratization processes of many African States:  
―Coincidentally, these xenophobic sentiments have emerged at a time when most 
of Africa is democratizing and governments are compelled to take into account 
public opinion in formulating various policies. The result has been the adoption of 
anti-refugee platforms by political parties which result in anti-refugee policies and 
actions by governments.‖70 
The impact of diminishing burden sharing and growing ignorance by the 
international community should not be underestimated either, as western donors 
were getting more and more reluctant in funding development projects, thus 
including funds for refugees.71 These, together with the austerity measures 
imposed by the International Monetary Fund, limited the resources of the host 
countries to deal with refugees.72  
 
Some, like Milner, challenge the pronounced dichotomy between ―golden age‖ and 
the end of asylum altogether.73 While he agrees that there was a shift in refugee 
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treatment towards a less generous granting of asylum, he rejects the idea of a 
―golden age‖, as, according to his argumentation, asylum policies were always 
motivated by political and strategic considerations. This period is thus not the 
result of ―traditional African hospitality‖:  
―A closer reading of Africa‘s asylum history would, however, appear to suggest that 
issues of national security, domestic politics and international relations have 
always played a more significant role in the articulation of national asylum 
policies.‖74 
 
To conclude, in order to understand the development of asylum in Africa it is 
necessary to reflect upon the two main periods of refugee treatment, but not to 
idealize the beginning of asylum politics. The treatment of refugees always reflects 
a multitude of factors: historically, the main reasons for more restrictive asylum 
policies and a decrease in the rights that refugees actually enjoyed can be found in 
the magnitude of the refugee flows, diminishing funds, the different nature of the 
asylum seekers and the growing xenophobia in many African countries that 
developed in the late 1980s. 
 
2.2. Asylum in Kenya 
 
After the historical context of refugee protection in Africa, now a closer look will 
be taken on the evolution of the asylum system in post-independence Kenya. 
 
2.2.1 After colonialism: a State-run asylum system 
 
Kenya has had a long history of receiving refugees from neighbouring countries, 
even before it gained its independence in 1963.75 However, the main income of 
asylum seekers started afterwards. Due to its relative stability and geographic 
position, being surrounded by instable and repressive regimes, it has remained the 
prime destination for many asylum seekers.76   
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From the first decade until the late 1980s, it was mostly refugees from Uganda who 
came to Kenya, at first fleeing Idi Amin‘s and then Milton Obote‘s regime. The 
reception of these refugees did not cause substantial difficulties to Kenyan 
authorities, because their number was relatively low and many had relatives living 
near the border, which made integration easier. Additionally, they began returning 
to Uganda after the overthrow of Obote in 1985.77 
The end of the 1980s marked the arrival of heterogeneous refugee groups and a 
rise in the number of refugees, which led to the collapse of the administrative 
system and caused a shift in asylum policies and the rights that refugees enjoyed.78 
 
Until 1991, refugees were administered by the State: it was the Government of 
Kenya through the Ministry of Home Affairs that realized its responsibility towards 
asylum seekers and refugees by administering their claims. At that time, refugees 
were not yet a specific legal category in domestic law. Although Kenya is a 
signatory to the relevant international refugee frameworks, its Constitution makes 
it necessary to implement these provisions into national law in order to be 
applicable. This implementation had not been done until 2006, but refugees were 
rather subsumed under the Immigration Act79 and the Aliens Restriction Act.80  
Foreigners who entered the country to seek asylum, were required to go to a 
Reception Centre in Thika, a town near Nairobi. There, their asylum interview was 
conducted. The Reception Centre also contained the capacity to house up to five 
hundred asylum seekers. The Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process took 
about three months and contained three steps.81 Firstly, a questionnaire had to be 
filled out, where asylum seekers explained the reasons of their flight. The next 
step was an interview with an officer of the Ministry, during which the applicants 
again told their story orally. Finally, a security test was conducted: if the 
applicants had so far been successful, Kenya‘s intelligence agency examined their 
cases in order to sort out criminals, spies and potential security threats to the 
                                                 
77 Abuya 2007: 57.  
78 Hyndman/Nylund 1998: 24ff.  
79 The Immigration Act. Republic of Kenya: 1984.  
80 The Aliens Restriction Act. Republic of Kenya: 1985. 
81 Skari, Tala/Girardet, Edward: Urban Refugees: Out of the Public Eye. In: Refugees, 1985, 23: 15. 
Quoted after Abuya 2007: 66.  
 21 
country. If then a person was declared a refugee by the Ministry, he or she 
obtained an ID card and was allowed to stay in Kenya.82  
Additionally, UNHCR in Nairobi conducted interviews with persons who were not 
able to go to Thika. Moreover, it sometimes provided complementary protection to 
asylum seekers who had been rejected by the Government. UNHCR declared them 
―Mandate refugees‖, which describes a person ―who meets the criteria of the 
UNHCR Statute‖83, but had not been accepted by the host State as a refugee. The 
legal classification of these ―Mandate refugees‖ was and is not clear, and will be 
further discussed in chapter 3.3.  
 
The protection offered by the government and the rights that refugees were able 
to enjoy were, to a certain extent, in accordance with international refugee and 
human rights law.  
One of the cornerstones of refugee law is the principle of non-refoulement, which 
prohibits States from expelling recognized refugees and deporting them back to 
their country of origin.84 Although Kenya was a signatory to the Refugee 
Convention, in which this principle was first laid down, it had not yet implemented 
it into its domestic legal framework until 2006, and so was not obliged to observe 
it. But some legal experts of the time85 claimed that the principle of non-
refoulement had become a part of customary international law. Customary law is a 
source of international law, defined as ―evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law‖.86 It derives from the practice of an international legal personality, i.e. mostly 
States, together with the opinion, that this practice is legally required (opinio 
iuris).87  
According to some, this is applicable for the non-refoulement principle: ―[T]his 
principle has evolved from a basic humanitarian duty into a general principle of 
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international law that binds all States, even in the absence of an express treaty 
obligation‖.88 
The question whether Kenya respected this rule is debatable: some authors89 claim 
that the government did indeed deport refugees in the early 1980s, especially back 
to Uganda. Others90 reject this allegation as not substantiated and argue that 
Kenya did not refoule refugees. The upholding of the principle of non-refoulement 
was due mainly to financial constraints and the fact that refugees were not a 
priority to government policies. One article even goes so far as to say: ―what may 
appear to be an open migration policy may be nothing more than the inability of 
the government to effect any control over [its refugees].‖91 
 
Refugees were allowed to move freely within the country and to choose their place 
of residence, which also gave them the possibility to integrate into the host 
community. As for working, refugees had the right to gain employment and were 
encouraged to be self-reliant. This encouragement, however, was not provided by 
the government but rather by the aid agencies, churches and UNHCR. And the 
theoretical right to work did not mean that refugees found access to the labour 
market easily: on the contrary, the overwhelming majority of refugees were not 
working – at least not documented and thus not in the formal economy – but relied 
on social assistance by aid agencies.92 As an example, a research conducted in 1984 
found out that only ―one percent of the refugees found employment‖.93 
Refugee children had access to primary education and, in addition, language 
courses and vocational trainings were offered by churches. Some agencies also 
provided scholarships and financial aid in order to help underprivileged students to 
continue their studies. Children thus enjoyed the right to education, but only a 
small number had effective access to educational institutions due to financial 
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constraints.94 Hence, Kenya allowed refugees to go to school, but did not provide 
enough affordable facilities.  
 
It can be summarized that during the first decades after independence, Kenya 
fulfilled its international responsibility as an asylum State to a certain extent. It 
conducted the RSD process and granted various fundamental rights to forced 
migrants.  
 
2.2.2. The 1990s: the crash of the protection system 
 
During the late 1980s, the security situation in several countries surrounding Kenya 
aggravated which led to the income of uncommonly high numbers of asylum 
seekers. The largest proportion of refugees originated from Somalia. In 1991, the 
Somali president, Siad Barre, was overthrown and the following months witnessed 
the beginning of the ongoing power struggles in the country.95 Somalia, which had 
been under Barre‘s rule for more than two decades, collapsed after a resistance 
movement had claimed power and the fighting grew into a civil war that is still 
continuing today.96 
This led to the flight of thousands of people heading for Kenya, an average of 800 
to 2000 Somalis coming into the country each day.97 Since then, Somalis constitute 
the highest number of refugees in Kenya. 
In the same year, Ethiopia‘s president, Haile Mariam Mengistu, was ousted and 
several members of the military, students and civilians fled to Kenya.98 
Furthermore, the civil war in Southern Sudan was still raging, causing a high 
percentage of Internally Displaced Persons and thousands coming to Kenya. A well-
known example are the ―walking boys‖, a group of several thousands of children 
and young (mostly) men who started walking away from the internal war in Sudan 
until they arrived in Kakuma refugee camp several years later. The numerous 
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internal conflicts resulted in an unexpected rise in asylum seekers, as these 
statistics show:  
 
 
 
Figure 1: The number of refugees in Kenya, 1980-199099 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The number of refugees in Kenya, 1991-2001100 
 
The country had never before experienced such an income of immigrants: ―In 
summary, by 1991 Kenya, which had previously hosted some 15,000 refugees, was 
playing host to some 130,000 refugees — an increment of more than eight fold. Just 
over a year later this figure had shot to almost 400,000.‖101 
The rising numbers caused the total collapse of the Refugee Status Determination 
and protection system in 1992: while before that, each claim had been processed 
individually through one-on-one interviews, by then, this was made impossible. 
Instead of the costly solution of hiring more personnel in Thika and modifying the 
now inadequate registration and determination process, the government stopped 
exercising its responsibility towards asylum seekers and asked UNHCR for help. So, 
it was UNHCR who took over the responsibility for conducting RSD. 
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The UNHCR Office stepped in this protection gap by deciding to grant asylum 
seekers refugee status on a prima facie basis in order to process asylum claims no 
longer on an individual but on a group basis.102  
Another measure of the Kenyan government, apart from suspending the individual 
status determination, was the creation of refugee camps. This decision was built on 
the belief that it was necessary for refugees in order to be able to administer 
them, get the attention of the international community and to raise the now 
needed additional funds. Therefore, the government provided land for the creation 
of four camp complexes. The first was created around the coastal area of 
Mombasa, because Somali asylum seekers began arriving by boat at the coast of the 
Indian Ocean. Other camps were established around Dadaab, which also were 
mostly for Somalis. There was another camp near Mandera, a border town next to 
Ethiopia and Somalia, mainly for Ethiopian and Somali refugees. And finally in 
Kakuma, a small town near the Sudanese border, a camp was built to host the 
majority of Sudanese refugees.103 
The Government of Kenya provided the land for establishing the camps but did not 
take any additional responsibility: it was left to UNHCR to administer the camps. 
Together with the creation of these camps, a new policy required refugees to stay 
in the ―designated areas‖ and not to leave them: ―In the bureaucratic jargon of the 
post-1991 refugee regime in Kenya, refugees have to reside in camps ‗until a 
durable solution is found‘.‖104 
In 1995, just three years after the establishment of the camps, the government 
decided to close the ones surrounding the coast and in Mandera, giving the 
explanation that many refugees there were engaged in illegal economic activities. 
The refugees residing in these areas were relocated to Dadaab and Kakuma with 
the help of UNHCR.105 This decision was heavily criticized: there is no doubt that 
the forced relocation into remote and unfamiliar regions had negative if not 
traumatic effects on a large number of these refugees.106 Concluding, since the 
mid-1990s, there have now been two main camp complexes where refugees are 
obliged to stay – including certain exceptions discussed later. 
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A further consequence of the changing situation was the promotion of voluntary 
repatriation of refugees. In 1992, the Government under President Daniel arap Moi 
announced that Somali refugees had to go back to their country and asked UNHCR 
to organize the return.107 This was conducted through the ―Cross-Border 
Operation‖, during which UNHCR created an area around the Kenya-Somali border, 
where refugees were provided protection and assistance, similar to the concept of 
―safe zones‖.108 The aim of this operation was to ―promote a process of voluntary 
repatriation and to avert new refugee influxes‖.109 
 
 
Figure 3: The „Cross-Border Operation‟ between Kenya and Somali110 
 
To summarize, the 1990s meant a major shift in Kenya‘s refugee policy. It was no 
longer the government that was responsible for refugee protection but this 
obligation was handed over to UNHCR. Refugee camps were created and asylum 
seekers and refugees were now obliged to stay in these camps. Repatriation was 
encouraged, for example for Somali refugees through the creation of ―safe zones‖ 
by UNHCR. 
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The reasons for this shift are for one, as laid down, the fast increase in the 
numbers of displaced persons and, accordingly, the surge in asylum claims. Another 
explanation is Kenya‘s declining economy and the diminishing funds for asylum 
procedures which where exacerbated by the Structural Adjustment Programs 
imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.111 The 1990s also 
saw a rise in xenophobic attitudes and anti-refugee discourse from the highest 
political leaders.  
To put it positively, these measures were aimed at upholding the principles of 
asylum and non-refoulement, but they therefore sacrificed other, previously 
guaranteed liberties and rights of refugees.112  
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3. Refugee Rights in Kenya today 
 
3.1. An overview 
 
Most refugees in Kenya have lived in the country for many years if not decades and 
will probably stay for some time to come. The refugee situation in Kenya can thus 
be called a ―protracted situation‖. This means that refugees have lived in exile for 
more than five years without any immediate prospect of finding a durable solution 
to their plight by means of voluntary repatriation, local integration, or 
resettlement.113 That is why this paper focuses on the living conditions and the 
rights of refugees after arriving in Kenya rather than on the flight, the problems of 
getting in or the resettlement process. 
The subsequent chapters are divided chronologically following the steps a forced 
migrant faces in Kenya: at first, a look into the principle of non-refoulement will be 
taken as it provides the basis for the stay in the host country without being 
expulsed. Secondly, the RSD process will be discussed, as obtaining refugee status is 
required in order to be able to exercise other rights. And then, after having arrived 
in the country, for most the typical concern is the question where to live, which 
gives rise to discuss at length the issues of employment and the right to work, 
elaborating the similarities and differences between refugees living in camps and 
urban refugees. Finally, problems such as security and police harassment will be 
discussed shortly.  
The choice of the mentioned rights is mostly based on the field work carried out. 
Before going to Kenya, I had a very clear idea of which rights I considered important 
for refugees – for example, I thought it essential to receive the official refugee 
status. But in the course of the interviews and participant observations, both 
experts and refugees seemed to have a different prioritization, such as the desire to 
work or problems with the police due to IDs. I therefore adapted my hypotheses in 
order to present those rights which have been considered as being most important 
by the people involved.  
 
                                                 
113 Crisp, Jeff (2003): No solutions in sight: the problem of protracted refugee situations in Africa. 
New Issues in Refugee Research. Working Paper No. 72. Geneva: UNHCR.  
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Each chapter will begin with the theoretical analysis of the respective right and 
Kenya‘s international and national obligation, before comparing the theory with the 
practice, and thus see if refugees do indeed enjoy these rights today. The aim is to 
verify the assumed discrepancy between the law in the books and the actual legal 
situation. 
 
3.1.1. The contextualization of the term ―refugee‖ 
 
One interviewee in Kakuma noticed: ―Before I came to Kenya, I was all sorts of 
things. The moment I crossed the border, suddenly all I was, was a refugee.‖114 
The use of the term „refugee― is inevitable in this paper, which makes it all the 
more important to be aware of the connotations it invokes. Refugees are often 
represented as victims, as helpless and vulnerable – one explanation is that this 
image is useful for agencies and organizations to generate funds. It is assumed that 
to portray refugees as a group desperately in need of international assistance, 
donors will be less reluctant to finance a project. This representation can be 
observed more generally in the development discourse and the stereotypes 
adhered to the opposition between ―merciful helpers‖ and ―thankful receivers‖.115  
―Contrary to what I believed in Uganda [before being expelled], a refugee is not 
just a person who has been displaced and has lost all or most of his possessions. A 
refugee is in fact more akin to a child: helpless, devoid of initiative, somebody on 
whom any kind of charity can be practised, in short, a totally malleable 
creature.‖116 
Related to this construction is the idea that refugee populations are a homogenous 
group with equal needs and concerns, disregarding the endless differences in age, 
country of origin, gender, education, etc.117 Unlike in earlier decades, when 
refugees were sometimes equalled with ―freedom fighters‖, today, there exists a 
dichotomy between ―good‖ and ―bad‖ refugees. ―While images of the ‗good‘ 
refugee who is starving and helpless may motivate people to become helpers, there 
                                                 
114 Conversation with a refugee at Kakuma, September 2010 
115 For example in Gomes, Bea de Abreu Fialho/Maral-Hanak, Irmi/Schicho, Walter (2006): 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Akteure, Handlungsmuster und Interessen. Wien: Mandelbaum.  
116 Mamdani, Mahmood (1973): From citizen to refugee: Ugandan Asians come to Britain. London: 
Frances Pinter: 7. 
117 Harrell-Bond, Barbara: Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees be Humane? In: Human Rights 
Quarterly, 2002, 24/1: 56f. 
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is an alternative stereotype of ‗bad‘ refugees as thankless, ungrateful, cheating, 
conniving, aggressive, demanding, manipulative, and even dangerous persons 
(…)‖.118 This can be observed in Kenya as well, where refugees are on the one hand 
treated as victims who need help in form of food distributions and the like, but are 
on the other hand obligated to stay in remote parts of the country, hindered to 
enter the job market or, in the case of Somali refugees, even prevented from 
entering the country.  
Thus, the term refugee is highly essentialist and constructed – this thesis will not 
deconstruct this concept, but will rather be aware of its implication and use a 
rights-based approach defining refugees as everyone seeking asylum.119 
 
Another notion that needs to be examined shortly is the way gender is interpreted 
in regards to refugees. Although worldwide the majority of forced migrants are 
female, refugees are usually perceived as male, while women are a subcategory 
mostly only mentioned when discussing special needs and vulnerabilities.120 The 
last years have seen improvements, as for example gender-based reasons for flight 
have been acknowledged, so that a woman escaping forced marriage or female 
genital mutilation now has the right to receive refugee status.121 
Similar to development circles, where a feminist critique of the essentialization of 
―Third World women‖ has resulted in a more critical approach towards gender in 
development, discussions among Refugee Studies have led to the deconstruction of 
―refugee women‖ as a fight against the victimization and generalization of this 
category. 
 
3.1.2. Internally Displaced Persons 
 
Not always do those who are forced to flee cross an international border – they are 
then not considered asylum seekers or refugees but Internally Displaced Persons 
                                                 
118 Harrell-Bond 2002: 58. 
119 Legally, there is a strict distinction between asylum seekers and refugees, as somebody can only 
be called „refugee― through receiving the official status after RSD. This distinction will be observed 
in this paper when writing about the legal category, e.g. the section on RSD or right to work, but 
not when the two terms can be used interchangeably.  
120 Foote, Victoria: Refugee Women as a Particular Social Group: A Reconsideration. In: Refuge, 
1994, 14/7: 8.  
121 Cisse, Bernadette Passade: International Law Sources Applicable to Female Genital Mutilation: A 
Guide to Adjudicators of Refugee Claims Based on a Fear of Female Genital Mutilation. In: Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, 1997, 35: 429-451. 
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(IDP). They have become a growing concern to the international community, 
foremost because there are more IDPs than refugees worldwide, especially in 
Africa, and due to the vague legal framework that applies to them.122 IDPs often 
face very similar problems to refugees, but lack the assistance of organizations 
that refugees enjoy – for example, no single UN agency is responsible for IDPs. In 
Somalia and Sudan, the countries of origin for most refugees in Kenya, there are by 
far more IDPs there than refugees in Kenya.123  
However, as this paper takes a right-based approach and compares the framework 
for refugees, IDPs will be excluded from the analysis, as it would open another 
important but misplaced discussion. 
 
3.2. The fundamental principle of “Non-Refoulement” 
 
Before elaborating on civil rights for asylum seekers and refugees, the right not to 
be expelled when persecuted has to be examined. Non-refoulement is the first step 
towards protection for persecuted persons, because it forbids States to return 
asylum seekers without an assessment of their case. After laying down the State‘s 
obligation regarding this principle, it will be examined whether asylum seekers and 
refugees do indeed enjoy this right in Kenya. 
 
3.2.1. Kenya‘s obligation 
 
For refugees, in order to find protection, it is fundamental that they are not 
returned or expulsed to any country where they might be persecuted, foremost the 
country that they have fled from in the first place. This right is called the principle 
of non-refoulement,124 prominently laid down in the UN Refugee Convention: 
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.”125 
                                                 
122 Vincent, Marc: The UN and IDPs: improving the system or side-stepping the issue? In: 
Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, 2002, 19. 
123 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre: Countries. Somalia; Sudan. 2011. 
124 The term derives from refouler, French for ―to force back‖ or ―to push back‖. 
125 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: Art. 33 (1).  
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This principle is the cornerstone of refugee rights and a rule clearly designed to 
benefit refugees, as it offers the right to stay in the country of arrival without fear 
of being sent back to the dangers they fled from.  
The applicability of this principle is further enhanced by the popular opinion that 
non-refoulement has in fact become an integral part of customary international 
law.126 Additionally, this opinion was strengthened by the fact that State practice 
in the last half-century has shown a strong commitment not to return refugees, 
based on international law.127  
The wording of the above cited paragraph is quite self-explanatory; it only needs 
further interpretation on some aspects. For example, the question whether it only 
applies to refugees already within the territory of the country of asylum or if it also 
states an obligation of non-rejection of an asylum seeker at the border: in short, if 
there is a duty to admit an asylum seeker or not. The majority of countries follows 
the concept of an obligation and has recognized that non-refoulement starts the 
moment the asylum seeker presents him- or herself for entry. This means that ―the 
concept now encompasses both non-return and non-rejection‖128 at the border and 
―implies at least temporary admission to determine an individual‘s status‖.129 The 
temporary admission, in order to conduct the Refugee Status Determination, is 
vital as a person may otherwise be sent back awaiting persecution and a possibly 
life-endangering situation. This is an important assertion, as it means that non-
refoulement offers not only protection for recognized refugees, but also for 
everybody seeking asylum, at least until their Status Determination Process is 
completed. 
Another question sometimes raised is if non-refoulement has to be strictly adhered 
to even in the case of a large-scale influx which may constitute a threat to the 
administration, economy and environment of the country of asylum. The answer is 
yes: even if a sudden arrival of large movements of asylum seekers threatens to 
overwhelm the capacity of the host country, rejection or expulsion are not 
permitted. This implies that non-refoulement is not only applicable to individuals 
but also to a large group of persons. The most prominent case of a sudden influx of 
large numbers of asylum seekers in Africa and the question whether the 
                                                 
126 Customary law originates from the constant practice of countries and the belief that this practice 
is legally required, see above. 
127 Goodwin-Gill 2007: 211ff.  
128 Goodwin-Gill 2007: 208.  
129 Goodwin-Gill 2007: 215.  
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surrounding countries had to admit them or not was the Great Lakes refugee crisis 
after the Rwanda genocide. In the aftermath of the genocide, Tanzania and Zaire 
expulsed thousands of asylum seekers, mostly due to valid security problems. 
Noteworthy is the explanation of these countries: both countries did not argue 
against the applicability of the principle of non-refoulement in a mass influx 
situation, but rather denied violating the law and justified the expulsions by stating 
that the people who had been expelled were not genuine refugees but illegal 
aliens.130 The OAU Convention also contains the principle of non-refoulement in 
Article II.131 The provision of this Convention goes a step further than the UN 
Convention, as the non-refoulement principle of the UN Convention is accompanied 
by an exception: expulsion is not prohibited if an individual refugee is a danger to 
the security or to the community of the country of asylum.132 There is no such 
limitation in the Convention of the African Union, which is why the provision is 
considered an ―absolute‖ prohibition of refoulement.133 Moreover, the OAU 
Convention expressly forbids rejection at the border, thus enhancing the right of 
asylum seekers to have their status determined.  
 
Historically, Kenya has only recently integrated the principle of non-refoulement 
into its domestic framework as recently as 2006, with the Refugee Act. As a dualist 
State, it was not bound by any international Convention before. However, there is 
a strong consensus that the principle of non-refoulement had already been 
established as part of international customary law – that is law that was generated 
by consistent and widely accepted State practice and the belief that this practice 
is legally required. Arguments supporting this point of view draw on a number of 
regional instruments, soft laws and various domestic frameworks embodying non-
refoulement. Further, State practice since the establishment of this rule and the 
argumentation whenever a State did in fact refoule refugees are in favour of the 
                                                 
130 Goodwin-Gill 2007: 229ff.  
131 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa: Art. II (3): ―No person 
shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or 
expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical 
integrity or liberty would be threatened (…).‖ 
132 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: Art. 33 (2): ―The benefit of the present provision 
may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a 
danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final 
judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the 
community of that country.― 
133 Okoth-Obbo 2001: 89f.  
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idea of non-refoulement as part of international customary law.134 Others dismiss 
this opinion as being ―wishful thinking‖135 and argue that there is not enough 
evidence of State practice to support this view. This discussion is in fact vital, as it 
defines whether or not Kenya was obliged to adhere to this principle and thus, 
whether forcibly returning refugees constituted a breach of international law 
before the enactment of the Refugee Act in 2006. As incidents of refoulement have 
in fact taken place before, this legal ambiguity was not helpful, on the contrary: a 
judicial controversy concerning such a fundamental refugee right furthers a 
situation of legal insecurity instead of presenting a strong voice against the 
endangering of lives. 
Today, the Refugee Act prohibits refoulement and even broadens the Refugee 
Convention definition, stating that:  
“No person shall be refused entry into Kenya, expelled, extradited from Kenya or 
returned to any other country or to subjected any similar measures, if […] the 
person may be subjected to persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion or the person‟s life, 
physical integrity or liberty would be threatened on account of external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public 
order in part or the whole of that country.”136  
This should answer several questions: The Act finally makes this principle 
applicable in Kenya and puts an end to the discussion whether it is embedded in 
customary law or not. Every person has the right to be admitted in order to 
conduct their status, which means that not only refugees, but also asylum seekers 
are protected from being refouled. That is the reason why the wording has been 
widely praised – it guarantees legal security and offers wide protection to people 
fleeing into Kenya.137 
 
3.2.2. Refoulement of Somali refugees? 
 
Incidents of refoulement in Kenya have been reported for many years, mostly by 
humanitarian agencies, international NGOs and national newspapers. Academic 
                                                 
134 Goodwin-Gill 2007: 208ff. 
135 Abuya 2007: 83f. 
136 The Refugee Act: Art. 18. 
137 Muigua 2010: 67 
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literature has been reluctant to pick up this subject, thus the following 
descriptions are based mostly on NGO reports and further on some of the 
interviews conducted.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, the so-called ―golden age‖ of asylum, Kenya, as the 
majority of African countries, upheld the main principles of asylum, including non-
refoulement. However, during this period, there have been some incidents 
reported, such as the case of a pick-up of around 2.500 Ugandan refugees who 
were taken at night by the police and deported over the border back to Uganda.138 
Still, there were not many incidents of refoulement in general – this is often 
explained by the government‘s open policy towards asylum seekers. Another 
explanation may be the Kenyan government‘s limited resources in regards to 
immigration and refugees.  
The 1990s marked the beginning of a globally stricter regime towards forced 
migrants. This was also clearly visible in terms of refoulement as, for example, in 
the year 1996 alone, more than twenty countries expelled refugees from their 
territories.139 An example is the Great Lakes refugee crisis after the Rwandan 
genocide, when Tanzania ordered ―all Rwandan refugees‖ to leave the territory as 
part of the Operesheni Rudisha Wakimbizi, which did indeed constitute forced 
repatriation and, thus, a breach of the non-refoulement principle.140 In Kenya, the 
shift towards a more restrictive treatment of asylum seekers and refugees 
coincided with the arrival in large numbers, and the collapse of the asylum system 
and its shift towards UN responsibility.  
 
One measure, which was heavily criticized internationally, was Kenya‘s closure of 
the border with Somalia in January 2007. The background for this decision was the 
invasion of Ethiopian troops into Somalia in support of the Transitional Federal 
Government of Somalia. A spread of the Somali conflict by fighters entering Kenya 
was feared, therefore endangering Kenya‘s national security. Kenya‘s then Foreign 
Minister Raphael Tuju said that the country was ―not able to ascertain whether 
                                                 
138 Juma, Monica (2000): The Politics of Humanitarian Assistance: State, Non-State Actors and 
Displacement 
in Kenya and Uganda (1989-1998).  Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy Thesis: University of 
Oxford: 132. quoted after Abuya 2007: 81.  
139 Whitaker, Beth Elise (2002): Changing priorities in refugee protection: the Rwandan repatriation 
from Tanzania. New Issues in Refugee Research. Working Paper No. 53. Geneva: UNHCR: 330. 
140 Whitaker 2002: 330ff.  
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these people [Somali immigrants] are genuine refugees or fighters and therefore 
it‘s best that they remain in Somalia.‖141 Since then, hundreds of Somali asylum 
seekers have been either hindered from entering or, more frequently, sent back to 
Somalia.  
 
To close a border in order to prevent the arrival of refugees violates the principle 
of non-refoulement: as laid down above, rejection of asylum seekers at the 
frontier is already considered as violating the principle of not returning a person to 
a place of possible danger. Border closures automatically reject all possible asylum 
seekers at the frontier and place them at risk of further persecution, thus violating 
this principle.142 Especially at the beginning of the closure, many Somalis were 
hindered from entering Kenya. But the 680 km border is hard to control and today, 
this measure does not effectively prevent the entrance of Somali asylum seekers, 
as alone in 2008 around 60.000 new arrivals crossed the border.143  
The reason for the closure given by the government was their concern with national 
security. It is indeed valid to expel a refugee due to his or her threat to the 
security of the country of asylum. But this is a measure only applicable for 
individual refugees after a fair process in which the individual is examined, thus it 
is not possible before an asylum procedure has taken place.144 But the border 
closure denies access to a fair asylum process. As neither a RSD process took place 
nor did the closure regard specific individuals, concerns for national security were 
hence not a valid reason for border closure. 
The impact of the closing was foremost a decline in the upholding of human rights, 
arbitrary police arrest and numerous incidents of refoulement. As for today, Somali 
citizens continue to cross the border – not at established border points, but rather 
seeking alternative entry points in order to avoid security personnel, often paying 
smugglers to help cross the border. Once in Kenya, the new arrivals are sometimes 
taken by the police and forced to pay a bribe or else taken to prison and often 
deported back to Somalia. This is in fact so endemic that smugglers often include 
                                                 
141 Quoted after Human Rights Watch 2009: 12.  
142 Amnesty International (2007): Kenya. Denied refuge. The effect of the closure of the 
Kenya/Somali border on thousands of Somali asylum seekers and refugees. London: amnesty 
international: 7ff.  
143 Human Rights Watch 2009: 1.  
144 Amnesty International 2007: 8.  
 38 
the bribes to be paid as part of their fees.145 Together with the Somali border, the 
UNHCR run Refugee Centre of Liboi was closed, so that now, asylum seekers have 
to make all the way of more than 100 km to the Dadaab camps in order to claim 
refugee status – and are not provided with assistance in the border area. This, 
again, increases their vulnerability of attacks and police harassment and has the 
side-effect that they are not documented at the earliest, in turn enhancing a 
phenomenon the Kenyan government tries to overcome – ―illegal immigration‖. 
One incident of refoulement in connection with the closure is well documented: At 
the day of the border closure in 2007, around 400 people were forced to return to 
Somalia. They had been waiting at the Refugee Centre of Liboi, when Kenyan 
police ordered them into a truck and drove to the Somali side of the border to an 
unknown place, where they were left without any further thoughts about 
humanitarian assistance or the reasons for their flight.146  
The Refugee Act came into operation at the beginning of 2007, and the closure and 
the following incidents of forcible expulsion or return happened earlier the same 
year, hence violating Kenya‘s national and international obligations regarding non-
refoulement. 
 
Apart from the border closure, which still continues today, every year incidents of 
forcible return are reported, mostly about Somali immigrants. Refugees in Kenya 
are in general not allowed to move freely across the country but obliged to stay in 
refugee camps or ask for a Movement Pass in order to travel from one place to 
another.147 But often, the police ignore the Movement Pass of refugees and 
threaten them with forced removal or arrest them in order to extort bribes.148  
There have been numerous cases of people being subsequently sent back to their 
countries of origin without further procedure as to whether they are recognized 
refugees. Sometimes, ignoring their refugee status, these refugees are charged 
with unlawful entry or presence. But more often, the police simply send back 
individuals they consider illegal immigrants. 
 
                                                 
145 Human Rights Watch 2009: 21f.  
146 Amnesty International 2007: 3f.  
147 For more see the chapter on „Freedom of Movement― 
148 Amnesty International (2010): From life without peace to peace without life. The treatment of 
Somali refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya. 
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An example is the story of a 26-year old asylum seeker who arrived in Nairobi and 
got an Appointment Slip from UNHCR for the RSD process. Unfortunately, he was 
stopped by police officers, who tore his letter into pieces, and charged him with 
illegal entry. In court, where he was not represented by a lawyer and did not 
follow the proceedings very well due to language problems, he was sentenced to a 
fine and repatriation to his country of nationality. The court did not assess his 
claims that he was in fact a refugee. Fortunately for him, while in prison waiting to 
be sent back, a refugee rights advocate heard of his case and helped him.149  
Another example occurred in July 2008, when around 70 Somali refugees were 
stopped by the police and detained for ten days in a prison in Garissa, a town near 
the Somali border. They were later picked up by the police and driven to Somalia, 
told to get out of the pick-up and not to return.150 Those were just two examples 
that happened to be reported to international or Kenyan NGOs and therefore 
became public. But there exist estimates that say that these reports are only the 
tip of the iceberg and refoulement happens on a regular basis.151  
 
One reason lies in the change of refugee policy through the Refugee Act in 2006, 
implemented in 2007. Before this Act, refugees were not addressed legally as a 
special category but fell under class M immigrants according to the Immigration Act 
of 1967. Today, the Immigration Act is still in place, but not valid for refugee-
specific issues. The Immigration Act punishes ―unlawful entry‖ into Kenya with a 
fine and repatriation.152 But the Refugee Act explicitly prohibits punishment for 
illegal entry when asylum is claimed.153 The knowledge about refugee rights in 
general and the new Act in specific is not yet widespread among the Kenyan police 
and justice personnel. ―In general, the Courts in Kenya do not appreciate refugee 
matters; often they decide to return a refugee without further investigating when 
                                                 
149 Njamwitha, George: The legal dilemmas facing refugees. In: Refugees Insights. Newsletter of the 
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150 Human Rights Watch 2009: 18.  
151 Human Rights Watch 2009: 17. 
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someone is charged with unlawful presence.‖154 Recently, in February 2010, two 
decisions of the High Court of Kenya were pronounced which quashed the 
conviction of refugees travelling from Kakuma to Nairobi unlawfully and therefore, 
making a statement in favour of the Refugee Act and denouncing the attempted 
refoulement of those refugees.155 
 
In a nutshell, there have been positive developments in Kenya to prevent the 
refoulement of refugees, namely the implementation of the principle in the 
Refugee Act and a strengthened application of this rule. At the same time, 
numerous cases of refoulement have been reported, especially of Somali refugees 
in connection with the border closure in 2007. The concerns about a spread of 
violence and the Somali conflict over the border into Kenya were legitimate, but 
the measure of border closure was neither in line with international and national 
refugee law nor effective in regards to national security, as Kenya‘s Minister of 
Immigration, Otieno Kachwang, stated: ―The border closure has not achieved what 
it was intended for‖.156 
 
One interviewee concluded to doubt that many incidents of refoulement happen in 
Kenya today, mostly because of the costs and logistics it involves: ―Refoulement is 
costly and if the refugees are left in the country, it‘s the UNHCR that takes care 
and not the Government, so it does not make sense to deport refugees.‖157 Thus, it 
can be said, that incidents of refoulement do indeed take place, especially in 
border areas and at a higher risk for Somali refugees, but not on a large scale. 
However, every single case that leads to the persecution of an asylum seeker or 
refugee is a breach of this life-saving right. 
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3.3. From “asylum seeker” to “refugee”: the Refugee Status Determination 
Process 
 
A person seeking refuge has to undergo a procedure – the Refugee Status 
Determination Process (RSD) – in order to determine whether this person falls under 
the legal definition of ―refugee‖ and is eligible to protection. The status of a 
refugee is vital for a number of civil and economic rights, such as for the right to 
work, to apply for resettlement and for protection from non-refoulement. In many 
European countries, the steps of getting the status often take several years and are 
full of legal hurdles – this development is also seen in Kenya. There are two RSD 
procedures in place: individual RSD and prima facie. The process laid down here 
describes the individual status determination process – in Kenya, Somali and 
Darfurian asylum seekers undergo a more rapid prima facie process which will be 
examined further down, in chapter 4. After presenting the different steps of the 
process, several problems inherent to RSD will be discussed. 
 
3.3.1. RSD in Kenya 
 
International refugee and human rights law do not regulate the principles of RSD or 
the duration of the process. Therefore, it is upon every State to decide its own 
procedure. In Kenya, the RSD used to be processed by an Eligibility Committee 
headed by the Kenyan Government. They conducted interviews with the individual 
asylum seeker and decided whether he or she fell under the legal category of 
―refugee‖. A formal procedure for determination had not been established but the 
Committee took interviews on an individual basis and assessed the cases with 
regards to the Immigration Act and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.158 In 1991, due to the rapid increase in numbers of asylum seekers and 
the limited resources allocated to refugees,159 the governmental RSD programme 
broke down and UNHCR stepped in. They began to process asylum claims and still 
do so today. Under the Refugee Act, the Government of Kenya is responsible for 
RSD through the Commissioner for Refugee Affairs, who shall help the Committee 
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and ―receive and process applications for refugee status‖.160 Until now, this task 
has not yet been resumed by the Government.  
 
Today, the RSD is processed both in Nairobi and the two camp complexes by UNHCR 
on the basis of the UN Refugee Convention and the OAU Convention. After entering 
the country, the asylum seekers have to present themselves at UNHCR and ask for 
an interview - the majority apply for the status determination in one of the camps. 
In Kakuma, new arrivals have to present themselves at the Department of Refugee 
Affairs which will transfer them to UNHCR. UNHCR can then declare a person a 
―Mandate refugee‖ – but as it is not a State and, hence, does not have the 
sovereignty to declare someone a refugee, the legal status could be challenged. 
This results in the problem of ID issued by UNHCR, as will be shown further down in 
chapter 3.6. 
There are different procedures depending on the country of origin: Somali and 
Darfurians are granted prima facie refugee status, Eritreans and Ogadens from 
Ethiopia are subject to a fast track procedure as they are almost always considered 
refugees. Southern Sudanese refugees have a very low acceptance rate and 
generally come to Kenya to flee poverty or lack of educational opportunities, which 
do not fall under the Convention definition. Therefore, there is also an accelerated 
process for Southern Sudanese, where the claimant is usually immediately rejected 
or offered full individual RSD. All other nationalities automatically undergo 
individual RSD. 
UNHCR Nairobi operates in the neighbourhood of Westlands, where huge numbers 
of people arrive every day early in the morning in order to register. They are 
registered and questioned by a UN officer and usually directly transferred to either 
Dadaab or Kakuma camp. If they wish to stay in Nairobi, they have to sign that they 
can provide for themselves independently from UN help and receive an 
Appointment Slip (also known as Appointment Letter), a document that indicates 
the date of the registration. At the time of research, in August 2010, the earliest 
date available was March 2012 (hence one and a half years).161 After registration, 
the applicants come back at the indicated date and are questioned about ―their bio 
data, date of the entry into Kenya, country of origin, family situation, former 
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work, their fingerprint to ensure that nobody tries to come back under another 
name once rejected, their dependents are all written down on a form and a 
photograph.‖162. If literate, they write down their life stories and why they were 
compelled to leave their countries of origin. They then receive a Registration 
Letter and are once again asked to come back in order to conduct the RSD 
interview. In the interview, the asylum seekers describe their lives, the reasons for 
the flight, the way they entered Kenya etc. The Eligibility Officer, who conducts 
the interview, often with the help of a translator, then gives a recommendation on 
how to decide the case. The recommendation is generally accepted by the 
Protection Officer who is responsible for the decision. In case the applicant is 
rejected, they receive a form letter stating the decision and reasons for the 
rejection, and that the applicant has the right to make a written appeal within 30 
days of notification. The reasons for the negative decision are highly cursory and 
general, such as ―lack of credibility‖, ―inconsistency‖ and ―lack of well-founded 
fear‖ – this makes it difficult to appeal. On appeal, the decision will be made by a 
different Protection Officer: it is either reversed or confirmed, sometimes with a 
second interview beforehand. If reversed, the asylum seeker is given refugee status 
and a Mandate Letter. If the decision is confirmed and the case thus rejected, the 
asylum seekers have the possibility to ―request a reopening‖ of the case, which is 
seldom approved, otherwise they have to leave the country within 30 days. 
 
3.3.2. Justice delayed is justice denied 
 
―The process for RSD can take quite a long time, unfortunately, because of the 
limited resources that we have and the huge number of new arrivals that we‘re 
getting, who require full RSD.‖163 
 
There is no internationally binding refugee or human rights instrument that 
prescribes a time limit for the RSD process, neither does Kenyan law. The UNHCR 
Handbook requests its officers to process RSD claims ―in the most timely and 
efficient manner possible‖,164 the time between the date of registration until the 
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RSD interview should not exceed six months,165 and a decision should be reached 
within two months after the interview.166 This requirement is not met by UNHCR 
itself. In an empirical study conducted on RSD in Kenya, about 70% of the claimants 
interviewed complained about the delay between their first contact with UNHCR 
until the final decision.167 It mostly takes several years of waiting until a decision is 
reached, or even longer if the decision is negative and an appeal is made.  
 
 
Picture 1: Illustration from an artist at Kakuma refugee camp168 
 
In Kakuma, during the month of August 2010, UNHCR finalized over 100 decisions, 
yet during that same time, over 200 new asylum seekers arrived. Therefore, the 
backlog is quite substantial: ―Right now, we just finished all of the 2007 cases, so 
it‘s at least two years.‖169 The situation is similar at UNHCR Nairobi. 
There are rare cases for which the process is fastened, for example for high-
insecurity-cases or victims of trauma. In 2001, a group of Ethiopian students fleeing 
into Kenya went on hunger strike after delay in the RSD, requesting the assessment 
of their cases in order to complete their studies. The incident was being widely 
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reported and the students were guaranteed a timely procedure.170 These are, 
however, exceptions to the rule of prolonged procedures.  
 
Essentially, the reasons behind the backlog are financial restraints of UNHCR. For 
years, the organization experienced a shortfall of income, which forced them, 
among other measures, to cut back on staff.171 However, it should be remembered 
that it is not actually UNHCR that is responsible for RSD and that the Government 
of Kenya does not yet meet its legal obligations. Several steps towards a greater 
responsibility of the Department of Refugee Affairs have been taken – hopefully, 
the process will be shifted to the DRA within the next years.172 
During the years of waiting, due to lack of recognized documentation, many asylum 
seekers remain vulnerable to arrest, police harassment and deportation as illegal 
aliens.173 Therefore, the old legal saying ―justice delayed is justice denied‖ does 
have its true core in this case. 
 
3.3.3. The option of appeal 
 
If the decision from the Status Determination is negative, the asylum seeker is not 
considered a genuine refugee. He or she will receive a written letter of rejection 
stating in ambiguous terms the reasons for rejection, for example: ―Upon 
consideration of your application for registration as a refugee in Kenya, we regret 
to inform you that your case was rejected for substantial material inconsistencies 
and in particular your claim was found incredible with respect to your background, 
reasons for flight and available country of origin information. Further, your claim 
did not satisfy the [R]efugee [C]onvention criteria.‖174  
The effects of such generalized terms cannot be underestimated: in order to file an 
appeal, the applicant has to state the reasons as to why his or her case does indeed 
fit the refugee definition. How can he or she challenge the decision if it is not clear 
why the claim was found incredible in the first place? Further, legal assistance is 
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normally expensive and scarce in the camps – RCK and Kituo cha Sheria have begun 
to step into this protection gap. And apart from legal considerations: being 
essentially called a liar often has a negative effect on asylum seekers already 
battling trauma. 
The claimant can then file a written appeal within 30 days. The time limit is quite 
restrictive. However, it is not exercised strictly.175 Here again, the presence of 
legal counselling through NGOs is vital. 
 
For the appeal, the applicant may be interviewed again depending on whether the 
application is based on new evidence or on a procedural error. The appeal has to 
be processed by a different officer than the one who decided in the first instance. 
This is essential in safeguarding an independent evaluation of the case. Yet, this 
may seem difficult in a camp setting with a limited amount of personnel who work 
and live closely together. Here again, resources and more personnel are required to 
fill this gap. 
 
To put it in a nutshell, it is the State that is legally responsible to carry out Status 
Determination, but this task has been taken up by UNHCR due to Kenya‘s failure in 
the 1990s to guarantee RSD. International and Kenyan law fail to set a clear 
framework for RSD, which makes the process vulnerable to budget constraints. 
These financial limits are mostly responsible for many of the flaws in the process, 
such as a delay in the assessment of the claims which includes long waiting times 
during which the person is restricted in several rights. Also, it may cause a difficult 
situation for the asylum seeker in case the decision is negative after years of living 
in Kenya. It is in the interest of all parties involved (asylum seekers, country of 
asylum, UN, NGOs, country of origin, etc.) to fasten the process.  
Another problem is the lack of explanation in case of a negative decision and 
consequently, the difficulty to file a successful appeal. Here, legal counselling is 
necessary in order for asylum seekers to enjoy their full rights. The importance for 
a fair and fast RSD process is evident as the applicant otherwise may not receive 
the refugee status and be sent back to the country of origin: ―The determination of 
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refugee status has potentially profound implications for the life and security of the 
individuals concerned.‖176 
 
3.4. Freedom to move and choose a place of residence 
 
By analyzing the basic human- and refugee rights instruments together with national 
law, this chapter addresses the issue whether refugees have the right to free 
movement in Kenya. Further, it compares the factual situation of refugees‘ lives in 
camps and urban centres to answer the question whether or not these rights can be 
exercised in practice. 
 
3.4.1. The freedom of movement as a human right 
 
The exercise of the freedom of movement and choice of residence cannot be 
overestimated – for example, a court decision on this right argues that the liberty 
to move within States is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of any other human 
right.177 
The freedom to move within a State and to choose a place of residence is one of 
the most basic human rights and thus protected by numerous treaties and 
agreements. Internationally, first evidence of this right is found in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHC), agreed upon in 1948, which states in Article 
13 (1) that ―everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within 
the borders of each State”.178 The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) was, together with the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), an elaboration of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, with the aim to expand international human rights and implement them 
better through the therefore established Human Rights Committee. Today, the 
ICCPR is the treaty fundamental for the freedom of movement within States.179  
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It provides the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his or her 
residence in Article 12, stating in paragraph 1:  
“Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, 
have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.”180 
 
In analyzing this phrase, it can first be noted that the Covenant uses the term 
―liberty of movement‖. Liberty, in a general sense, is ―the right of an individual to 
be free from restrictions or encroachments subject only to those provided by the 
law‖.181 Liberty is a strong term to employ – this enhances the view that everyone 
is guaranteed free movement and it may only be restricted under exceptional 
circumstances.  
Article 12 includes the condition of ―lawfully within the territory‖, thus makes 
lawful entry or presence the first condition for free movement. The question 
whether someone is lawfully in a country is regulated by domestic law – as refugees 
obtain per se a regulated status, they automatically fall under this category.  
 
 The right to free movement of the ICCPR includes an explicit limitation in 
paragraph 3:  
“The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those 
which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order 
(ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and 
are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.” 182 
There are thus three conditions for a restriction: firstly, the restriction has to be 
provided for by law, secondly, it has to be necessary to protect national security, 
public order, public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others and 
finally, it has to be consistent with other rights in the Covenant.  
The question as to what is meant by ―law‖ is a very wide and philosophical one. In 
this context, the first condition ―provided by law‖ initially refers to domestic law, 
in our case Kenyan law. Kenyan domestic law has to make a specific regulation on 
the limitation of the freedom of movement of refugees in order to restrict it. As 
this would allow subjective restrictions by the respective State, which includes 
thus the danger of arbitration, domestic law itself is not enough to proclaim a 
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restriction. Instead, human rights jurisprudence ―requires that the meaning of the 
term ‗laws‘ must be sought in the context of an international treaty rather than in 
domestic law of a State party and attaches certain conditions on the quality of the 
domestic laws concerned.‖183 
The second condition is based on the concept of State sovereignty: a State can 
restrict internal movement and residence on the basis of his public interests. Public 
interest causes include national security, public order, public health or morals – as 
these terms, especially ―public order‖ and ―public morals‖, are vulnerable to 
extensive interpretation, it is necessary that, in case they are employed, the 
restrictions must be proportionate to the public interest in danger. The restriction 
must be ―necessary‖ to prevent the threat on the public interest, by weighing the 
severity of the security concerns against the established limitations.184 
Thirdly, the restrictions must be consistent with other rights in the ICCPR. The 
common interpretation of this phrase argues that a limitation of the liberty of 
movement ―ought not to negate the ability to enjoy other rights contained in the 
Covenant because of the interplay between those rights and freedom of 
movement.‖185 Thus, a limitation of the freedom of movement must still allow a 
person, also a refugee, to enjoy other rights such as the right to privacy, to 
freedom of speech and association or the right to a fair trial. 
To summarize, in order to limit the freedom of movement for refugees based on 
the ICCPR, not only does international law have to include this possibility, it must 
also be proportionate and be pronounced and the limitation has to provide that all 
other rights of the Covenant are still guaranteed – these provisions assure that such 
a restriction is only possible as a rare exception and the right to move freely is the 
norm. 
 
3.4.2. The freedom of movement for refugees 
 
The ICCPR is a human rights instrument and therefore regulates the freedom of 
movement for every human being. As explained above, human rights directly apply 
to refugees, which means that the freedom of movement from the ICCPR has to be 
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guaranteed for refugees, as it is for any other person.186 However, the liberty to 
move and reside freely has also been determined specifically for refugees by the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in Article 26:  
“Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right 
to choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory subject 
to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.” 
Although reservations for this Article are not forbidden and indeed widespread, the 
Government of Kenya has not made any reservations in this regard.187 Hence, this 
Article is fully applicable to refugees in Kenya. 
 
The Refugee Convention also includes restrictions on the freedom of movement 
which can be classified into three categories.188 The first limitation is provided for 
by Article 9, which allows the State to take provisional measures essential to the 
national security ―in time of war or other grave and exceptional circumstances.‖189 
This limitation requires a complex procedure including the proclamation and notice 
of war, the proportionality of the limitation and the connection of the measure to 
national security. Furthermore, it only refers to asylum seekers and not to 
regularized refugees.190 
The second category restricts the movement for persons entering the country 
unlawfully, as expressed in Article 31.191 Asylum seekers who enter or stay in the 
country of asylum unlawfully may then be restricted from free movement. Again, 
this limitation refers to asylum seekers only and does not apply to refugees, as 
their status has already been regularized. Hence, these two categories cannot be 
used as an argument for limiting refugees‘ free movement. 
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Thirdly and most commonly, persons who have already been granted the refugee 
status can also be restricted from moving freely and choosing their place of 
residence. This limitation is inherent in Article 26 of the Refugee Convention. 
Article 26 explicitly refers to refugees ―lawfully in its territory‖. In various Articles, 
the Refugee Convention distinguishes between refugees ―lawfully in‖, refugees 
―lawfully staying‖ and refugees without additional provisions. These are highly 
discussed expressions. According to Durieux and McAdam, ―it appears that the 
differing terminology is intentional and depends to a large extent on which rights 
carry financial or social responsibilities or multilateral implications for the host 
State.‖192 For example, the right to self-employment or the question of expulsion 
are linked to lawful presence, while the rights to social security, labour protection 
or association are guaranteed only to ―refugees lawfully staying‖. The 
differentiation indicates that lawful presence is in accordance with the law, while 
―lawfully staying‖ exceeds refugees ―lawfully in‖, because these refugees have had 
a certain time of residence in the country of asylum.193 But this discrepancy is not 
entirely solved and questions on interpretation remain.194 However, in a note on 
the interpretation of these terms by UNHCR, the authors conclude that ―‘lawful 
stay‘ means a permitted, regularized stay of some duration‖.195 This applies to the 
vast majority of refugees in Kenya: they are permitted, regularized and most have 
been living in the country for several years. 
Thus, refugees in Kenya have the same freedom to move and choose their place of 
residence as other non-nationals. As there is no regulation on the general limitation 
on the freedom of movement applicable to all aliens in the same circumstances, 
refugees obtain the right to move freely in Kenya.196 
 
A look at the new Kenyan Constitution, promulgated in August 2010, further 
enlightens the debate on the applicability of this right on refugees. While 
discussions surrounding the referendum on the matter focused mainly on land 
rights, abortion and Islamic law,197 there was also a significant change regarding 
the freedom of movement in Kenya. In the previous Constitution, it said: ―No 
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citizen of Kenya shall be deprived of his freedom of movement (…)”,198 with a very 
long list of provisions allowing for restrictions. Noteworthy is the limitation to 
―citizen‖, thus, refugees were not automatically included in the freedom of 
movement under constitutional law. The new Constitution changed this provision to 
one short Article, stating: “Every person has the right to freedom of 
movement.”199 Therefore, in literally interpreting this Article, refugees are 
included in the wording of ―every person‖, which guarantees them free movement 
within Kenya. This issue was raised during one interview with a UNHCR lawyer, who 
agreed with this interpretation but said that the High Court will have to determine 
its definite interpretation, which is going to be requested by UNHCR after the 
implementation of the new Constitution.200  
 
Kenya has also signed and ratified the OAU Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems which does not contain a specific provision relating to 
the freedom of movement. Member States are merely obliged ―to receive refugees 
and to secure the settlement of those refugees‖201 provided that the location of 
the settlements is safe.202 As the Convention is silent on any further qualification, 
it cannot be used as an instrument against the restriction on the liberty to move 
freely: ―In principle, however, restrictions which may be applied generally to limit 
the movement and residence of refugees as a matter of safe location are 
permissible.‖203  
Another reason for a restriction is established in a peculiar stipulation not found in 
any other instrument regulating refugee law internationally. By far the most 
controversial provision of the OAU Convention is the Prohibition of subversive 
activities. It prohibits refugees from ―subversive activities against any Member 
State of the OAU‖ and ―any activity likely to cause tension between Member 
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States, any in particular by use of arms, through the press, or the radio‖.204 As the 
language of this Article is quite imprecise, the interpretation of the regulation 
varies. Indeed, a study undertaken by the Lawyer‟s Committee for Human Rights 
states that ―what is most striking is the double standard operated by Governments 
everywhere. Whether or not a host government restricts the political activities of 
refugees depends almost entirely on its own alignments and preferences.‖205  
The idea behind this prohibition was to avoid tension between States that accept 
refugees from another State, but its negative effects cannot be denied: That the 
refugee, whose flight might even be the result of his or her political activity, is 
only allowed to stay in the receiving country if passive and silent on political 
matters of the country of origin.206 
In a nutshell, States can restrict the free movement of refugees justified by the 
prohibition of subversive activities. However, a restriction can only be permitted 
for particular individual refugees; furthermore, there must be evidence for the 
subversive activity and proportionality between the alleged activity and the 
measure to restrict the movement.207 
International refugee law does indeed allow for a restriction on the free movement 
of refugees, but human rights law clearly provides everyone with the right to free 
movement and choice of residence. Further, the new Kenyan Constitution 
guarantees both refugees and asylum seekers the right to free movement. 
 
3.4.3. The encampment policy 
 
The Kenyan Refugee Act does not include a specific regulation regarding the 
freedom of movement but refers to international law, thus, guaranteeing the 
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liberty to move and choose a place of residence for refugees.208 However, from the 
early 1990s on, refugees were required to stay in camps – this regulation had not 
been pronounced in domestic law but started as a new government policy. Being 
heavily criticized by numerous humanitarian organizations, the government 
nevertheless did not step away from the already carried out encampment policy, 
but rather endorsed it and secured it on the national level through the Refugee 
Act. The Act includes a regulation on refugee camps: “The Minister may, by notice 
in the Gazette, in consultation with the host community, designate places and 
areas in Kenya to be refugee camps.”209 Furthermore, there are sanctions for 
refugees who leave the camp: “Any person who resides without authority outside 
the designated areas (…), commits an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a 
fine (…) or to imprisonment (…), or to both such fine and imprisonment.”210  
On the one hand, the Refugee Act claims to be consistent with international 
refugee law and includes the rights of the Refugee Convention, but on the other 
hand it requires refugees to stay in specific areas and not to choose their place of 
residence freely. The question is whether this is a contradiction or whether camps 
and the obligation of refugees to stay in them are consistent with the right to free 
movement. Before answering this question, it is important to take a closer look at 
the situation of refugee camps in Kenya as the term ―refugee camp‖ itself includes 
rather different conceptions of human settlements who often significantly vary in 
size, structure, political character and possibility of free movement.211  
 
The question whether international law and refugee camps are compatible or not 
has not authoritatively been answered yet. There is a strong voice of international 
refugee law experts who argue that the temporary restriction to designated areas 
does not violate the Refugee Convention in the case of a mass influx or a similar 
situation of emergency.212 The foundation for this approach is found in a 
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commentary on the Refugee Convention which states in a footnote that ―[t]he 
provision of Article 26 would also not conflict with the special situation where 
[refugees] have to be accommodated in special camps or in special areas even if 
this does not apply to aliens generally.‖213 For Kenya, I doubt that today‘s refugee 
situation is a ―special situation‖. Considering that the mass influx of refugees in 
the 1990s may have constituted such a situation and indeed allowed for the set up 
of camps and the restriction of movement, this measure has to be only temporary 
and conditional upon the special situation, in this case the sudden mass influx.214 
As for today, there is a high number of refugees in Kenya and a steady arrival of 
asylum seekers, but a large number of the camp populations are made up of people 
who have been living in Kenya for several years. Hence, a special situation is not 
given, but the situation has been the same for years, so even according to the 
Commentary on the Refugee Convention, the confinement of refugees to 
designated areas in Kenya is not consistent with its international obligations. 
Other authors215 base their argumentation upon the ICCPR and its non-
discriminatory approach on the freedom of movement. Remembering the three 
conditions for the limitation, which are the provision of the restriction by law, the 
necessity to protect public interests and the consistency with other rights of the 
Covenant, the restriction to designated areas can be dismissed as violating these 
requirements: although the Refugee Act now provides a domestic legal ground for 
the restriction, the ICCPR does not differentiate between refugees and other 
aliens, but even affirms their non-discrimination regarding the right to free 
movement. Therefore, the requirement of refugees but not the rest of the non-
nationals in Kenya to reside in camps is not consistent with other provisions of the 
Covenant.  
 
Although the legal framework is vague, many governments and even international 
agencies seem to prefer encampment over open settlement.216 The reasons for the 
construction of camps are multifold. Some argue along the lines of what may be 
best for refugees and state that there are ―practical advantages from the 
standpoints of service delivery, accountability, identification of individuals, 
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physical access, cost effectiveness of the relief operations and monitoring of both 
the refugees‘ status and received assistance‖.217 Refugees would, if able to choose 
where to settle, often prefer to live in camp-like structures and around points of 
aid delivery anyway. Further, camps would permit refugees to continue living in 
their own communities and provide them with better economic conditions than 
having to settle on their own, and in turn decreasing the crime rate among asylum 
seekers and refugees. If these reasons which argue along the best interest of 
refugees are correct, then why not let refugees decide where to live? These 
arguments are thus not based on evidence but dismissed by many as xenophobic 
prejudices. 218 
The argument of the effectiveness of assistance and status determination is a valid 
concern, however it would only be applicable in the first months of a refugee influx 
as later on refugees should be encouraged to be self sufficient instead of a 
continued dependency on aid. Another, maybe more important reason for 
encampment policies is the influence of donors: ―Refugee policy in the South has 
been largely driven by the demands of donors and humanitarian organizations.‖219 
Most humanitarian organizations, foremost UNHCR and refugee agencies, 
discourage encampment policies theoretically and do not stop to speak out against 
them. Nevertheless, it is not their responsibility or mandate to decide where 
refugees should settle220 and as many host governments do prefer encampment 
because of a perceived threat to national security by self settled refugees, the 
humanitarian community often considers camps as inevitable and does not present 
alternatives but rather works along these policies and supports the implementation 
and organization of camps.221 The ―positive‖ effect of refugee camps for host 
governments and humanitarian organizations is not only their proclaimed better 
assistance for refugees but also an increase in donor funding: camps are clearly 
visible to the international community. Also, presenting refugees as helpless and 
dependent on aid may create more funds than presenting the far more complex 
reality of diverse types of settlement and refugees.222 
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The confinement to camps affects both the lives of refugees and those of the host 
communities, i.e. the local populations living around or near refugee camps. For 
refugees, the strong dependency on foreign aid has already been discussed. The 
situation of confinement, combined with the quasi-impossibility for refugees to be 
employed formally leads to a high degree of dependency on the humanitarian 
organizations managing the camp. Being dependent on food rations, firewood, 
medical treatment or primary education, refugees cannot become self sufficient, 
and are thus discouraged to sustain themselves economically. The limitation of free 
movement deprives refugees of their social and economic networks, again 
increasing their dependency. Nevertheless, I strongly denounce the idea of 
refugees in camps as being passive, sitting around helplessly and waiting for their 
food rations. On the contrary, visiting Kakuma camp, I was astonished by the 
busyness of the place, where various shops sell clothes and items of everyday use 
next to a hairdressing studio, children go to read in the refugee run library, 
journalists are meeting to discuss the next edition of their local newspaper and 
telephone bureaus offer international phone calls. But this is due to the initiative 
of the people having to live in the camp, and not because but despite the external 
circumstances.  
 
Local integration into the host community, one of the three long-term solutions for 
protracted refugee situations, is hindered through the encampment policy. Indeed, 
the encampment leads to the establishment of parallel services for refugees in the 
camps and the local populations, often poorer than some refugees, which in return 
generates hostility.223 This is a valid concern in Kenya and has been addressed by 
UNHCR policy which now offers similar services, e.g. free medical treatment or 
schooling, to non-refugees living around the camps.224  
Although security is often raised as an argument in favour of camps, the security 
situation in many camps, including Kakuma and especially Dadaab, is appalling.225 
Examples from other camp situations also show a possible militarization of camps: 
well known is the refugee crisis after the Rwanda genocide, where camps were 
heavily militarized and often controlled by the génocidaires who used them as a 
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recruiting basis and lead attacks into Rwanda.226  Particularly at risk are protracted 
refugee situations without a long-term perspective for the refugees in the 
camps.227 This is the case for the Kenyan camps, yet militarization is not 
considered as a major problem compared to other security risks. Further, 
environmental concerns are often raised in regards to camps: in Kenya, both camp 
complexes are highly overcrowded and put a strain on local resources, e.g. 
firewood. 228 
 
The two camp complexes in Kenya can be described as artificial and overcrowded 
environments in remote areas of the country, where refugees are theoretically 
enclosed in the restricted camps. The Dadaab camp complex near the Somali 
border in Northeast Kenya, the world‘s largest refugee camp, comprehends three 
separate camps – Dagahaley, Ifo and Hagadera – and is home to mostly Somali 
refugees. It is highly overcrowded, which results in the sporadic relocation of 
refugees to Kakuma camp,229 situated in the Turkana region next to Kakuma town 
in the north of the country hosting mainly Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees. Both 
regions are in very remote areas and can be described as the ―periphery‖ of 
Kenya.230 They have long been neglected by the Kenyan government, which results 
in a poor quality of available public services. The areas are semi-arid, thus farming 
or agricultural activities are difficult if not impossible and keeping cattle, as the 
majority of the local populations does, is not an option in the camps.231 Therefore, 
the dependency on humanitarian organizations for food, daily necessities, but also 
medical care, education or employment opportunities is very high.232 Although both 
camp complexes are located on the countryside of Kenya, they are characterized 
by certain urban features in regard to the population density, the economic 
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dynamic including international trade networks and its cosmopolitan character. 
Thus, ―il évoque plutôt une sorte de ghetto urbain en milieu rural‖.233 
 
 
Figure 4: Refugee camps in Kenya234 
 
Legally responsible for both camps is the Government of Kenya, yet the 
administration of the camps is left to UNHCR and its implementing partners. An 
implementing partner is an organization that implements programs on behalf of 
UNHCR which also provides it with funding.235 These include, among others, CARE, 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the National 
Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and the Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK) 
which cover different branches, from food distribution to health care, education or 
environmental programs.236 
Today, the Department of Refugee Affairs has taken steps towards a greater 
responsibility for refugees: asylum seekers entering Kenya have to register at the 
DRA before applying for the Status Determination at UNHCR, and the Movement 
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Pass is issued jointly by the DRA and UNHCR. But the government does not play a 
major role yet as, for example, the DRA in Kakuma only employs four workers.237  
 
According to the OAU Convention, refugees should be settled ―at a reasonable 
distance‖ from their countries of origin,238 which UNHCR identified as a minimum 
of 50 kilometres. Both camps adhere to this rule as they are situated approximately 
at 100km from the respective border. Furthermore, UNHCR constitutes that the 
camp population should not exceed 20.000 refugees, however, all camps in Kenya 
host a considerably larger number.239 
 
As for freedom of movement, the official policy of the government of Kenya is that 
the refugee camps are ‗closed‘. Refugees are not allowed to settle elsewhere or 
even travel in and out of the camps without permission. If an asylum seeker 
directly arrives at one of the camps, he or she has to stay in the camp, unless 
provided with a Movement Pass. Asylum seekers who arrive in Nairobi are pre-
registered by the UNHCR office in town, but are expected to move on to one of the 
camps within 30 days. They are provided with a Movement Pass for their time in 
Nairobi, but no further assistance is given to them before arrival at a camp.240 Once 
in the camp, they are screened, registered and their status is determined. From 
then on, they are not allowed to move outside the camp. This does not include the 
immediate surroundings of the camp, thus refugees can move freely between the 
three camp complexes and Dadaab town and similarly between Kakuma camp and 
Kakuma town.241 If a refugee wants to travel further, he or she needs the 
permission, which is realized through a Movement Pass, a time-limited document 
including the bio data and a digital picture of the refugee. In theory, it should be 
the government that allows refugees to move,242 but for now, the pass is a 
document co-signed by the DRA and UNHCR that allows the refugee to travel 
outside the camp.243 In Dadaab and Kakuma, there are different procedures for a 
refugee to gain access to this document.  
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In Kakuma, the refugee has to give the reason for his or her wish to travel, then 
UNHCR prepares the document and co-signs it with the DRA. The reasons are 
foremost medical, educational or family visits.244 The duration of the travel is 
mostly between 15 days and three months for medical and personal reasons, and 
one year for education.245 The process of getting the Movement Pass usually takes 
around three weeks and the acceptance rate is very high. ―Rejection comes when 
there is maybe somebody has no definite reason as why he wants to travel. Because 
everybody…most refugees here never want to stay in the camp.‖246  
In Dadaab, it is much more difficult to obtain the Movement Pass. The 
overwhelming majority of refugees in Dadaab are from Somalia, which made the 
government decide for reasons of security and in fear of terrorism to introduce a 
more stringent and complicated procedure.247 In January 2010, a Security 
Committee was implemented which consists of the Kenyan Government through the 
Ministry for Probation, Registration and Internal Security, the Ministry of 
Immigration through the DRA, the Kenyan Police, the Criminal Investigation 
Department, National Intelligence Security Service and the Kenyan Army, and also 
UNHCR and RCK. A refugee who wants to travel has to apply personally before the 
Security Committee for the Movement Pass, and acceptance rates are lower than in 
Kakuma. UNHCR still speaks out strongly against this procedure: ―We thought it was 
a bad idea to make refugees stand in front of a room full of police and say why 
they wanted to go visit their relatives.‖248  
There is no explanation for the differences in procedure between Dadaab and 
Kakuma, but only the perceived fear of terrorism and illegal immigration from 
Somalia. Thus, discrimination is taking place concerning the treatment of asylum 
seekers and refugees from different regions, dividing them by the point of entry 
and, ultimately, according to their national or ethnic origin. The impossibility to 
find a fair and righteous explanation for the inequalities in obtaining a Movement 
                                                 
244 Human Rights Watch (2009): From Horror to Hopelessness. Kenya‘s Forgotten Somali Refugee 
Crisis. New York: Human Rights Watch: 45: The criteria for a valid reason to obtain a Movement Pass 
―have been developed on an ad hoc basis over time, are not prescribed by law or regulation, and 
are not available in written form.‖ 
245 Interview with Jeffrey Savage, UNHCR Kakuma, 09.09.2010 
246 Interview with RCK Kakuma, 08.09.2010 
247 Human Rights Watch (2010): ―Welcome to Kenya.‖ Police abuse of Somali refugees. New York: 
Human Rights Watch: 71ff.  
248 Interview with Jeffrey Savage, UNHCR Kakuma, 09.09.2010 
 62 
Pass further shows how the argument of security is used to justify the restriction of 
a basic human right – freedom of movement and choice of residence – for refugees. 
Still, there are a number of refugees travelling and living outside the camp without 
authorization, mostly due to long waiting periods for passes, especially around 
holidays, and unreasonably restrictive durations which make some overstay the 
time limit of their pass.249 But the Movement Pass is essential, because in case the 
police control a refugee who does not have the permission to leave the camp, the 
refugee will be returned to a camp involuntarily or even charged with unlawful 
entry and presence in Kenya and often asked for a bribe.250 Sometimes, the police 
are not aware of the document and do not accept the pass.251 The denial of 
recognition of the Movement Pass may in some cases even be intentional, as the 
incidence of one District Commissioner near Dadaab shows: he instructed the 
personnel not to allow any refugee to move out of the camp and to ignore their 
passes in order to prevent refugee movement at all.252 
 
To summarize, refugees in Kenya are required to live in camps although the legal 
basis for this type of settlement remains vague and is, according to my 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention and the ICCPR in comparison with the 
Refugee Act, contradicting the right to free movement. Encampment is favoured 
not only by Kenya, but by the majority of African countries. Still, ―the policy of 
organized settlement has not been a success: most refugees in Africa are 
spontaneously settled (…). There are two possible reasons: either governments and 
UNHCR are unable to accommodate the refugees or the latter are unwilling to be 
accommodated in settlements earmarked for them.‖253 This development towards 
narrowing down refugees‘ and asylum seekers‘ right to free movement can also be 
observed in Europe, for example in Austria, where a law amendment binds asylum 
seekers to stay in a housing complex for 120 hours and broadens the time-limit of 
arrest awaiting repatriation up to ten months.254 
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During the research process, every interview I took concluded with the question 
what the interviewee would change in regards to refugee rights if he or she had the 
chance to. The overwhelming majority started with the freedom of movement, 
together with a better implementation of the right to work. ―If I could change 
anything, it would be: let these people just live among the community. Get rid of 
the refugee camps.‖255  
This should finish the argumentation about camps and make a standpoint enhancing 
the right of refugees to decide themselves where to live.  
 
3.4.4. Urban refugees: a neglected reality 
 
Despite the aim of the Kenyan government to restrict refugees to camps, a vast 
number of registered and unregistered refugees live among the urban populations 
of Kenya‘s major towns. The main point of attraction is Nairobi, where a number of 
50.000 to 100.000 urban refugees are estimated. They live throughout the city, 
with a high concentration of Somali and Ethiopian immigrants in the neighbourhood 
of Eastleigh.256 
 
The legal status of these refugees regarding their stay in town differs. Before 
elaborating, it has to be stated that the question of the legal situations of urban 
refugees is not clear. Even in carrying out the expert interviews, differing and 
contradicting explanations were given when asked about the legality of their stay. 
While some deny the presence of refugees in towns altogether, another major 
opinion stated was that all refugees belong into camps and that everyone in town 
lives there illegally. This point of view is not right, however, the legality of urban 
refugees varies and often, asylum seekers and refugees in urban areas do not know 
themselves what their status entails.257  
In theory, the vast majority of refugees in Kenya is supposed to live in refugee 
camps. But there are certain administrative exceptions to the encampment policy. 
Firstly, refugees can obtain a Movement Pass that allows them to stay in Nairobi for 
a precise duration of time - mostly only some weeks or months, the maximum being 
one year for educational purposes – but they have to return to the camps after 
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their medical treatment or educational program. Furthermore, refugees undergoing 
interviews for resettlement in a third country are also issued a Movement Pass for 
the duration of this process.258 A small amount of urban refugees have been 
registered by the Government before the construction of camps in 1992 and have 
so far not been requested to live in a camp, and can therefore live as documented 
―Mandate refugees‖ in town.  
Finally, refugees arriving in Nairobi can either proceed to a camp or state that they 
prefer to stay in town. This is possible under one condition: they have to sign that 
they can and will provide for themselves in Nairobi and are ―economically self-
sufficient‖. Previously, refugees had to prove that they could provide for 
themselves, but nowadays they only have to sign a form stating that they are 
economically self-sufficient, thus relinquishing humanitarian assistance.259 This 
means that, while in the refugee camps numerous humanitarian organizations assist 
camp residents, urban refugees are not entitled to assistance from UNHCR. This is 
in fact contravening UNHCR mandate, as its main goal is to support refugees not to 
assist only those refugees who conform to restrictive national policies. UNHCR just 
recently revised its urban policy worldwide and took a step back from the idea that 
urban refugees are an irregular exception and towards ―the principle that the 
rights of refugees and UNHCR‘s mandated responsibilities towards them are not 
affected by their location, the means whereby they arrived in an urban area or 
their status (or lack thereof) in national legislation.‖260 Still for today, material 
assistance is not provided, but legal help and livelihood questions are more and 
more being addressed by Kenyan humanitarian organizations.  
If the person decided to stay in town, the RSD process at UNHCR Nairobi usually 
takes several months, if not years, while in the camps it is often processed much 
faster. For example, a Somali asylum seeker addressing UNHCR Nairobi in August 
2010 will get an appointment for the Status Determination in March 2012.261 In the 
meantime, these asylum seekers are issued with an Appointment Letter 
guaranteeing temporary legal status – but it is often not recognized by the 
                                                 
258 Pavanello,/Elhawary,/Pantuliano 2010: 13.  
259 Interview with a Registration Officer at UNHCR Nairobi, 13.08.2010 
260 UNHCR: UNHCR policy on refugee protection and solutions in urban areas. September 2009b: 3.  
261 Interview with a Registration Officer at UNHCR Nairobi, 13.08.2010 
 65 
police.262 Others are not aware of the process or fear they might be deported if 
rejected, further the cost of travelling to the UNHCR Office in Westlands and the 
length of the process make immigrants opt not to register. Many also leave the 
camp with a Movement Pass, but overstay the allowed duration and thus continue 
to live undocumented. The vast majority of refugees in town live there 
undocumented without falling into one of the categories of exceptions to 
encampment. Most of them are aware of their precarious status and the risk and 
vulnerability that it entails, mainly police harassment and possible prosecution.263 
 
The lack of clear policy and information regarding the legal status of urban 
refugees leads to a high amount of vulnerability and insecurity in many aspects of 
daily life including employment, education, health care or encounters with the 
police. Furthermore, assistance to refugees is provided only by a few churches or 
humanitarian programs, while the bulk of foreign aid is used for refugees in the 
camps. Still, many refugees choose to live in the city rather than a camp, despite 
the mentioned hindrances. Urbanization and the movement of people towards 
urban centres are global phenomenons and the various reasons motivating people 
worldwide can also be found among the individual reasons for the choices of 
refugees in Kenya. Alongside this trend, there are some specific factors 
encouraging refugees to live in town instead of camps: ―security threats, lack of 
adequate education and medical services, limited livelihood opportunities and 
harsh climatic conditions. In terms of security, refugees in Nairobi, particularly 
women, were concerned about the level of sexual violence and killings in the 
camps, particularly in Dadaab.‖264 Security was often mentioned as one of the 
reasons by Ethiopian and Congolese refugees, of whom some said that the very 
people that they fled from are in the camps trying to find them: ―The people who 
killed your family and the parents are in Kakuma, in the camp.‖265 Further, it was 
stated by the Nairobi based Kenyan NGO Kituo cha Sheria: ―Some refugees fear for 
their security from the government of the country they fled from: Especially 
Ethiopians, the government follows some to Kenya, abducts them and takes them 
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back. And for Somalis, some fear that they are followed by Al-Shabaab.‖266267 Apart 
from security, for many educational opportunities and better possibilities to engage 
in the informal economy and business are factors that influence the choice to stay 
in town. Also, refugees arriving from urban areas often prefer to live in town rather 
than in a rural camp.268  
 
Urban refugees face several challenges differing from those in camps. Firstly, the 
lack of humanitarian assistance is striking. Refugees are in general not allowed to 
be employed as will be discussed in detail further down. Poverty is a major 
problem for many urban refugees,269 but this phenomenon is not limited to 
refugees, as urban poverty is a general and growing concern in Kenya.270 Many 
refugees therefore turn to the informal economy and make a living by running 
businesses or engaging in casual labour, called jua kali. Another form of income are 
remittances from relatives living abroad, and also community help programs. While 
many of them are struggling to survive economically, others have turned their 
businesses into great success, as is true for the neighbourhood of Eastleigh which 
has only recently become a flourishing commercial centre in Nairobi due mostly to 
refugees‘ and other immigrants‘ informal labour.271 Thus, urban refugees are often 
not an economic burden for the city but manage to be self-sufficient and 
contribute positively to the economy. 
 
Apart from economic survival, urban refugees are coping with further challenges 
due to their intransparent legal status. Government officials do not welcome 
refugees to urban centres, on the contrary. Kenya‘s Vice President and Minister of 
Home Affairs threatened urban refugees in 2004: ―I am asking all refugees to report 
to the camps and those that will be found to be in the city and other urban places 
without authorization will be treated like any other illegal aliens. . . The 
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government will soon mount a crackdown on these illegal aliens with a view to 
flushing them out.‖272 This was not an empty threat as police swoops and 
harassment of refugees are a common problem, regardless of their documentation 
or legality of stay. Police officers are often unaware of refugee documentation, 
and the belief that all refugees in town are residing illegally is wide-spread.273 They 
routinely stop refugees or other immigrants and do not agree to release them 
unless a bribe is paid.274 Bribery is often a major revenue for police officers and 
refugees are prone to harassment, mostly as a result of their vulnerable legal 
status. Police officers frequently stop refugees coming or leaving UNHCR or NGO 
offices and patrol in refugee neighbourhoods, such as Eastleigh, sometimes 
organizing big crackdowns. Refugees are arrested arbitrarily, while their Movement 
Pass or Appointment Letter is ignored: ―Sometimes when they arrest the refugees 
who have the documents, they just throw out the document, throw it away and 
take them to the police station and then to court.‖275  
Refugees will not be detained or, if arrested will be released as soon as a certain 
amount of money is paid. ―For some police officers, refugees are seen as a mean to 
enrich themselves. They just arrest and ask for a bribe. Refugees are seen to have 
money, as if they are paid by UNHCR.‖276 Usually, if detained, the person tries to 
contact a friend or family member who then tries to raise the money often with 
the help of the refugee community. ―Because of the frequency of these incidents, 
bribe payments represent a large portion of a refugee‘s income.‖277 The problem of 
police harassment was confirmed by every refugee interviewed in Nairobi. 
During the period of research in Nairobi, larger crackdowns were organized, aiming 
primarily at Somali refugees and justified by national security concerns after the 
Kampala bombings in July.278 Some refugees were detained, taken to court or 
simply sent back to the camps.279 
 
                                                 
272 Campbell 2006: 401.  
273 Pavanello/ Elhawary/Pantuliano 2010: 17.  
274 HRW 2002: 42ff.  
275 Interview with Kituo cha Sheria, 12.08. 2010 
276 Interview with Kituo cha Sheria, 12.08.2010 
277 Pavanello/ Elhawary/Pantuliano 2010: 20.  
278 The July 2010 Kampala bomb attacks were suicide bombings at two restaurants in Kampala 
carried out by the Somali group Al-Shabaab. More: Nzau, Mumo: Counter-terrorism in the Greater 
Horn of Africa 2004-2010: Revisiting the Somalia Question. In: Journal of Language, Technology & 
Entrepreneurship in Africa, 2010, 2/2: 164.  
279 Interviews with Linet Opiyo, UNHCR Nairobi, 13.08. 2010 and with Kituo cha Sheria, 12.08. 2010 
 68 
To conclude, theory and practice overlap and contradict each other regarding the 
freedom of movement for refugees in Kenya. While international law guarantees 
refugees to move freely and choose their places of residence, the Government 
policy, established through the Refugee Act, restricts refugees to stay in camps. 
This, in turn, is contradicted by numerous refugees, who are mobile and enjoy 
their freedom of movement despite the discouragements it entails, such as police 
harassment, the lack of material assistance and their precarious legal status. Urban 
refugees prove the undeniable mobility of refugees and the ability of many to 
sustain themselves independently without the help of humanitarian organizations. 
They can be used as an example to promote a broader understanding of free 
movement in order to guarantee everyone the enjoyment of this right.  
 
3.5. Employment of refugees 
 
„Mgeni siku mbili, ya tatu mpe jembe“280 
 
The possibility to work and earn your own livelihood was mentioned as one of their 
major concerns by all refugees and asylum seekers interviewed. Employment is 
important on a number of levels: working is a means of survival, it makes refugees 
economically independent and thus reduces costs for aid agencies and the 
Government, it helps improving language skills and acquiring new qualifications, 
which in turn increases the sense of dignity and self-esteem and, last but not least, 
working contributes to the growth of the national economy. This is why UNHCR 
refers to the social and economic independence through access to the labour 
market and wage-earning opportunities as one of its mains objectives.281 
After describing the international and Kenyan provisions regarding refugees‘ and 
asylum seekers‘ right to work, a closer look will be taken at the situation of 
employment in Nairobi and the camps, mainly Kakuma, and the strategies 
employed by the individuals in order to overcome the shortcomings of the 
Government policies. 
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3.5.1. Are refugees and asylum seekers entitled to a right to work? 
 
To answer this question, a look at the Refugee Convention, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) states a big ―Yes‖ for refugees and a smaller 
―Maybe‖ for asylum seekers. The right to work and free choice of employment was 
first recognized in the UDHR,282 and later legally entrenched in the ICESCR, which 
states in Article 6: ―Everyone has the right to work (…)‖.283284 The question is 
whether these instruments apply only to nationals or to refugees and asylum 
seekers alike. A plain reading of the Article suggests that they do apply, and Article 
2(2) reinforces a non-discriminatory basis for the application of its rights.285 
However, Article 2(3) allows developing countries to limit the economic rights of its 
non-nationals: ―Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their 
national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the 
economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals.‖ Initially, 
the purpose of this Article was to end economic domination of non-nationals 
exercised during colonial times, but today it can be easily interpreted as a possible 
restriction on the right to work for refugees. To avoid this unplanned limitation, it 
needs to be interpreted narrowly.286 Therefore, under international human rights 
law, refugees and asylum seekers are both entitled to the right to work. 
The Refugee Convention regulates the right to work for refugees and not asylum 
seekers, and dedicates Chapter III to Gainful Employment describing wage-earning 
employment, self-employment and liberal professions. States are obligated to 
―accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favourable 
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treatment‖287 that they accord to other nationals of foreign countries. This means 
that refugees are not granted access the labour market on the same terms as 
nationals, but the Convention rather refers to national law in regard to 
employment for other non-nationals. It declares further that any restrictive 
measures on employment for refugees shall not be imposed after three years of 
residence in the country. For this provision, the Government of Kenya has made a 
reservation stating that restrictions are allowed until four years of residence.288 
Another reservation was made for paragraph 3: Kenya does not have to give 
―sympathetic considerations to assimilating the rights of all refugees with regard 
to wage-earning employment to those of nationals‖. Hence, according to the 
UDHR, refugees and asylum seekers should enjoy the right to work while the 
Convention enhances this right, with certain restrictions – it nevertheless 
guarantees refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya the right to work after a 
maximum period of four years.  
That the right for employment is indeed a contested provision proves the OAU 
Convention whose draft contained detailed provisions on employment, self-
employment or the liberal professions. And, although a central concern for the 
inauguration of the Convention was the unregulated quality of life for refugees 
without these regulations, the provisions on employment did not make it into the 
final version and nothing in respect to a right of work is mentioned in it today.289  
As the UN Refugee Convention refers to national law, the Kenyan Refugee Act, 
Immigration Act and Aliens Restriction Act need to be examined for its treatment 
of aliens. They state that immigrants may have the right to work if they are 
granted work permits. The Immigration Act requests all non-Kenyans to obtain a 
work permit, otherwise employment is illegal and both the employer and employee 
are guilty of an offence.290 Therefore, if an immigrant works while owning a work 
permit, he or she does so legally. This applies to refugees alike: The Refugee Act 
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follows international law and allows refugees to work under the same conditions as 
other non-nationals, thus authorizes refugees to obtain work permits on the same 
basis as other foreigners, as class M migrants.291 Therefore, it requests work 
permits for refugees in order to be able to work. 
 
To conclude, international human rights and refugee law accord to refugees the 
right to employment as does the UDHR for asylum seekers albeit with certain 
restrictions. The Refugee Act likewise entitles refugees to the right to engage in 
wage-earning employment with the same restrictions that are imposed on other 
non-citizens in Kenya.292 
 
3.5.2. The situation of employment in the camps: Equal pay for equal work? 
 
Employment in the camp is often hindered by several factors: the sheer lack of 
formal employment opportunities being one of them. Other than that, refugees are 
discouraged from leaving the camp as the main area in the camp are covered by 
UNHCR and its implementing partners and further, the camps are situated in the 
periphery of Kenya, far from major towns.  
After registration, both asylum seekers and refugees are entitled to ration cards, 
which should theoretically fulfil their needs concerning food and household items, 
firewood, accommodation, education and medical treatment are free. But most 
camp residents are not satisfied with the food rations given every 15 days as most 
run out of it before and also, due to a lack of vitamins.293 Some also complain that 
the staples they are given are not what they are used to eating. Humanitarian aid 
is often planned on the assertion that ―the‖ refugee population are ―homogenous, 
undifferentiated masses‖.294 ―Donation and distribution of food aid are 
characterized by the power to label recipients and designate them into a specific 
category ‗with a categorical prescription of assumed needs‘.‖295 One refugee told 
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the story of a food supplement in the food rations, a new product called ―Mix me‖, 
which is said to be very nutritious and people were told they should use it with 
every meal. But most were suspicious and did not take it – it was however 
accounted for in the daily need of calories.296 Therefore, and as agriculture is not 
feasible in either Kakuma or Dadaab, many choose to sell a part of their rations in 
order to obtain different kinds food and other items. 
The idea of food distribution essentially derives from an emergency treatment of a 
situation with the premise to save lives, but it is not at all adequate for a 
protracted situation like the one of long-term residents as it is in Kenyan camps. 
Nevertheless, food distribution and humanitarian assistance have been continued 
for two decades now. It is not only costly for the agencies but also 
counterproductive for the refugees: most express a strong wish to work instead of 
being rendered dependent on something they cannot even choose from.297 This is 
the same phenomenon for the restrictions on the freedom of movement through 
confinement to camps: while in an emergency phase, it can be argued to be 
beneficial for both asylum seekers and organizations to register, distribute aid and 
organize the inflow locally, the situation is now protracted and still this emergency 
concept has been in place for about 20 years.  
Although refugees are thus discouraged from becoming economically self-
sufficient, most find ways around the restrictive employment policies. Many 
agencies in the camps employ refugees, especially high qualified ones, for example 
as teachers, interpreters, supervisors, or drivers.298 But there is a catch with this 
idea: the people employed are not considered ―employed‖, but rather ―incentive 
workers‖. Incentive essentially stands for ―work for food‖; it is not a legal category 
but was coined by aid agencies. This implies that many international organizations, 
instead of paying salaries, entitle refugee workers only to ―incentives‖ and thus, 
incentive workers are not included and protected under the Labour Act.  Most do 
not have work contracts or they have monthly contracts which are renewed 
endlessly, even though according to labour laws, a regular employment contract 
has to be established within six month in order to prevent exploitation of 
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workers.299 While Kenyans, most from the host community living around the camp, 
and other foreigners, who all do basically the same work, are paid regular salaries - 
for example around 15.000-20.000 KSh for teachers - camp residents, irrespective 
of their qualification or individual experience, get only 3.000-4.400 KSh.300 This 
amount is not enough to cater for daily needs, and although the commodity prices 
at the markets in the camps have increased, the payments have not been adjusted 
for years. It has also been voiced by incentive workers that their payment is often 
delayed, sometimes for months, while contracted labourers are almost always paid 
on time.301 This inequality in payment and labour rights is often a source for 
frustration, but as other work opportunities are scarce, refugees compete for the 
available incentive jobs – being employed unfairly and insecurely is in general 
preferred to being dependent on handouts.  
 
When asked for the reasons for the inequality in payment, the answers given by the 
agencies vary. One line of argument is that refugees and asylum seekers are 
entitled to ration cards and can thus get basic services for free and do not need the 
salary to pay for it.302 This reason is misleading, as Kenyans living around the camp 
can and do access similar services, for example medical treatment and education, 
in order to minimize tension between the host community and the refugee 
population. UNHCR has referred to budget constraints when asked for a 
justification in the differences in salaries, but the constraints do not prevent them 
from paying regular salaries to Kenyan workers and other foreign staff. The fear 
that the creation of regular jobs would lead to the host community‘s demanding 
them can also be dismissed as the job will then be given to the person 
professionally most qualified, who may be a refugee or a Kenyan citizen.303 Another 
justification for incentives instead of work contracts and salaries lies in the idea 
that refugees and asylum seekers are working for their own ―refugee community‖ 
offering their services, e.g. teaching, to fellow refugees. But most teachers, 
                                                 
299 Interview with RCK Kakuma, 08.09.2010 
300 According an interview with a refugee in Kakuma, 10.09.2010. (Around 150-200 Euro and 30-44 
Euro.) 
301 Kanere 2009 2. 
302 Kanere 2009: 2.  
303 Interview with RCK Kakuma, 08.09.2010 
 74 
nurses, doctors, etc. around the world work for their fellow citizens, further, most 
do not identify as being part of a so-called ―refugee community‖.304 
An office of the Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK) has recently been established 
in Kakuma camp and their lawyers began to advocate on behalf of refugees and 
asylum seekers for equal payment. In the expert interview carried out, it was 
argued: ―We have to admit, the agencies engage refugees in our day to day work as 
a source of cheap labour. And as a source of cheap labour, we don‘t follow the 
normal legal procedures in this country.‖305 So, in order to follow the law and 
enhance refugee rights, the agencies should lobby for work permits for the camp 
residents they want to employ and give them a regulated position with all the 
benefits, such as health care, leave and equal pay. To conclude, it shall not be 
forgotten that it is not agencies that can guarantee refugees and asylum seekers 
the right to work but the Government of Kenya. As it is very difficult for camp 
residents to make a living and agencies are in need of qualified staff, e.g. 
interpreters, the idea to employ refugees benefits both parties. There is, however, 
no valid justification in the differences in payment and legal security.  
As incentive work is limited and agriculture not an option because of natural 
constraints, the informal economy plays a vital role not only for urban refugees, 
but also in the camps. It has already been mentioned that some refugees can not 
use all of the food given to them, not due to a lack of need but the differences in 
diet.306 Food is cultural, and if the traditional staples are not provided by 
humanitarian assistance, people find measures to access them.  Thus, the food and 
other items the refugees are given are sold, not only to fellow camp residents, but 
also to the surrounding areas, sometimes even abroad to the countries of origin. 
The items purchased vary, including daily items such as vegetables, injera, clothes, 
shoes, meat, milk, kerosene, matches, etc.307  
 
Flourishing businesses for many refugees are the markets in the camps. In Dadaab, 
it is mostly Somali refugees who established businesses with networks extending up 
to Somalia and Nairobi, the largest being Hagadera market. The competition with 
Kenyan businesses is intense – one strategy of the camp businesses is to buy large 
                                                 
304 Harrell-Bond, Barbara/Verdirame, Guglielmo (2005): Rights in exile: Janus-faces 
humanitarianism. New York: Berghahn Books: 221. 
305 Interview with RCK Kakuma, 08.09.2010 
306 Jamal 2000: 19. 
307 Pérouse de Montclos/Kagwanja 2002: 212.  
 75 
quantities of goods from Kenyan wholesalers, then adapting these goods to the 
often not well-off refugees and selling small packages, e.g. single tea bags and 
cigarettes or smaller pieces of meat. 
 
 
Picture 2: Hagadera market, Dadaab308 
 
It is also Somali who offer the majority of goods in Kakuma camp often working in 
cooperatives, where several families share the same stall. There is also an 
Ethiopian market, where there are more luxurious stalls such as video clubs, 
hardware stores, an internet café and restaurants.309 
 
 
Picture 3: Main road in Kakuma with the market310 
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310 Photo taken from the author in September 2010 
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The impact of these economic activities on the local communities is a matter of 
controversy. On the one hand, it can be said to be negative, because refugees 
consume and sell already scarce products such as firewood. On the other hand, the 
positive effects include the creation of new jobs also for the Kenyans living around 
the camps. In Kakuma, for example, Turkana men and women often sell charcoal to 
refugees and thus take part in the established trade.311 
 
3.5.3. Employment and livelihoods of urban refugees 
 
Urban refugees often have to struggle with their legal status that allows them to 
stay outside the camps, so the possibility to work through work permits may seem 
secondary. But access to employment opportunities is for many a decisive pull 
factor to move to town instead of a camp, and further, while people living in 
camps hold ration cards and most services are available locally, urban refugees 
have to fend for themselves, which indeed constitutes employment and income 
generation as a major concern. 
In order to work in the formal economy, all aliens including asylum seekers and 
refugees need a work permit.312 Work permits for refugees fall under class M, are 
valid for two years, and cost 50.000 KSh313 which is an immense and unaffordable 
sum for many. Further, the Ministry of Immigration announced in 2000 that they 
stopped issuing them due to an increase in forged permits.314 Another problem 
concerning work permits is the RSD process that is carried out by UNHCR: the 
refugee status that UNHCR declares may not be binding for Kenya as only a State 
can declare a person to fall under the refugee definition. So, according to one 
interviewee, only refugees who have arrived before the 1990s holding a status from 
the Government can obtain work permits.315 In fact, no one, neither refugee nor 
expert on refugees, has ever met anyone with a work permit. There is even a case 
of a highly qualified Somali refugee with a Master degree who was offered a 
position as a professor at a University in Nairobi, but was nonetheless denied the 
work permit.316 But in order to work, you need a work permit. As practically none 
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are issued, the possibility to work is denied both to asylum seekers and refugees in 
the camps and town. 
  
The great majority of urban refugees and asylum seekers therefore engage in the 
informal economy.317 An explicit definition of the informal economy is difficult and 
not necessary for the purpose. Therefore, in the context of this paper, it refers to 
self- and non-wage employment. The informal economy comprehends legal and 
illegal employment activities and is characterized by ―labour market insecurity 
such as low job tenure, absence or weak enforcement of core labour and 
employment regulations, weak framework for social protection and high levels of 
employment flexibility.‖318 
To engage in the informal economy, or jua kali as it is known in Kenya, is not 
unusual, on the contrary: experiencing a constant growth, in 2008 around 80% of 
the total employment in Kenya was in the informal sector.319 These results are not 
surprising  considering the sources of livelihoods for urban refugees. The informal 
economy is principally a survival technique when there are no job opportunities or, 
as is the case of asylum seekers and refugees, they are hindered through legal 
obstacles to enter the formal economy.320  
 
 
Figure 5: Sources of livelihoods for urban refugees in Kenya321 
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The majority of urban refugees are engaged in the informal economy, including 
work on construction sites, mechanics, shoe shiners, shop attendants, car washers, 
etc. New arrivals tend to first get work with family or community networks as they 
have often already established structures and are flexible about paperwork. To 
work in certain branches may depend on your nationality or kindred group. Some 
sectors work quite exclusively: hairdressing and tailoring, for instance, are very 
common among Congolese nationals, Somali often run call centres and internet 
cafés and a lot of Amhara Ethiopians are engaged in catering and matatus.322 But 
more often than not, asylum seekers and refugees cooperate and run businesses 
together, sometimes also with Kenyans; especially to register small businesses, a 
Kenyan partner is necessary.323 Those who have lived in Nairobi for a longer period 
of time are often self-employed through petty trade, which can be observed in 
Eastleigh where many Somali migrants and refugees have small roadside stands 
with fruits and vegetables, or their own stalls selling clothes, fabrics, shoes or 
electronics. Still other immigrants run their small businesses such as kiosks, 
telephone and internet cafés, selling the stimulant mira‟a, beauty salons or 
matatus.324  
Some of the refugee entrepreneurs have become very successful, as it can be 
observed in Eastleigh where supermarkets and shopping malls like the Garissa 
Lodge, developed by Somali refugees, are today the hub for trading and shopping in 
Nairobi.325 Another example for successful refugees outside the formal economy is 
the matatu industry: These minibuses began as an illegal form of transportation in 
Nairobi after independence but quickly became the most common mode of 
travelling, transporting people through Nairobi and all around Kenya and the 
neighbouring countries. Although the majority of matatus are owned by Kenyans, 
Somalis also own several matatus and established their position especially on the 
routes from Nairobi to the camps in Kakuma and Dadaab, which are in turn used 
predominantly by refugees.326 
Women and men have equally opened their own businesses or do casual labour – 
female entrepreneurs are often selling tea and coffee or vegetables on the 
roadside, and many are in the tailoring business or do laundry in mostly Kenyan 
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households.327 However, they often have further difficulties with being employed 
than male refugees and asylum seekers, therefore, some refugee women are part 
of Income Generating Projects offered by NGOs and church based organizations. 
 
None of the urban refugees I interviewed work in the formal sector, but they 
mostly do casual labour often waiting in the morning to be picked up for 
construction work or depending on friends calling them for a job; some have a 
small business and most further depend on aid from churches and aid 
organizations. One complaint sometimes raised was that Kenyan employers do not 
like refugee workers. One Ugandan refugee, having lived in Nairobi most of his life 
and therefore speaking fluent Kiswahili and Sheng,328 said he sometimes pretended 
to be Kenyan in order to get a job.329 In fact, some young men mainly from the 
Great Lakes Region conceal their refugee status in order to minimize tension with 
Kenyans and to get ahead at the labour market.330 Further, refugees denounced the 
vulnerability at work due to their ambiguous legal status. That accounts for the 
difference sometimes experienced in payment between asylum seekers and 
refugees and their Kenyan co-workers as well as the hazard of being laid off 
without salary. As one refugee put it: ―Because [my boss] knows, I can‘t do 
anything.‖331 
 
As Figure 5 shows, another source of income for many refugees are remittances. 
Remittances are funds, mostly money, sent back home by migrants living abroad.332 
About one third of all urban refugees receive and partly depend on remittances, 
mostly sent from members of their family or close friends in the diaspora. Somali 
and Sudanese refugees in particular receive remittances in many cases due to the 
lengthy conflicts in their countries and the therefore established big diaspora 
communities around the world.333 Obviously, it is not possible to state generally 
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how these money transfers are used and what role they play in the livelihoods of 
urban refugees – sometimes they arrive on an ad hoc basis, for example as a start-
up capital for a business or when a family member gets sick. Frequently, they 
arrive on a regular basis such as every month to cover for daily expenses or school 
fees. They therefore play an important role for the income of refugees and asylum 
seekers in Kenyan towns.  
 
Asylum seekers and refugees outside the camps are not entitled to food rations or 
other aid from UNHCR as they have to confirm that they are able to fend for 
themselves in order not to be confined to a camp. However, even if some refugees 
experience success in Nairobi, others have great difficulties in sustaining 
themselves due to the lack of employment – therefore, they can be described as 
poor.334 Some churches and NGOs therefore offer food distributions and financial 
help in case of an illness, for school fees etc. This survival strategy was also 
mentioned by the urban refugees interviewed: ―Every week, I go church, where 
they give me some money.‖335  
 
Formal employment does not play an important role for urban refugees, on the 
contrary: the majority work in the informal sector and run their own businesses, 
receive remittances from relatives overseas and humanitarian assistance. 
 
In conclusion, it should again be stated that refugees and asylum seekers, even 
with the more restrictive regulations of the Refugee Convention, do have the right 
to work after a maximum period of four years in the country. The majority of 
refugees in Kenya have been in the country for years if not decades, and find 
themselves in a so-called protracted refugee situation, but nevertheless lack the 
possibility to engage in the formal labour market. This development is 
counterproductive for all three possible solutions to a protracted situation – 
repatriation, resettlement in a third country or local integration.336 But as it was 
shown, the frustration over obstacles to engage in employment does not render 
refugees and asylum seekers helpless: many individual concepts have sprung up to 
provide economic independence, mostly rooting in the informal economy, both in 
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the camps and towns. Thus, they work around the restrictions placed by the 
Government and towards their right to employment. The unanswered question to 
remain is why the restrictions are in place as they have negative consequences for 
the refugee population, the financial situation of agencies and the economic 
development of the host country.  
 
3.6. Security, Identity Documents and the Police 
 
The above described rights and their violations have been singled out because of 
their frequent mention by refugees during the interviews and conversations. The 
following categories have been mentioned to a lesser extent, but they are 
nevertheless a concern for many and are connected with other rights. Therefore, 
they will be described shortly in this chapter. 
 
3.6.1. Is there a right to Security? 
 
Fear for life and well-being is most of the time the trigger for someone to leave the 
country of origin and make all the way to another country often facing many 
obstacles and hardships in order to find safety from persecution. Thus, safety is a 
prime concern for the majority of refugees and also UNHCR states that its first 
objective is to ―ensure safe and dignified asylum for all refugees‖.337 But 
sometimes the asylum country does not provide security and asylum seekers and 
refugees must continue their quest for safety.  
Security and safety in this section refer to personal security defined in the UNDP 
Report as security from physical violence, including threats from the State, from 
other States, from a group of people or individuals.338 It will first be examined 
whether there is even a right to physical security for refugees and who is 
responsible for it to be adhered to, then the various security concerns refugees 
face in Kenya will be described. 
 
As there is no mentioning of security after the arrival in the country of asylum, 
international refugee law does not provide for a right to physical safety for 
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refugees.339 Halperin argues in her thesis that there are however certain ideas and 
principles that can be deducted from refugee law which are also applicable to the 
security for refugees in Kenya. Further, a document adopted by the African Union 
states that ―governments should use their best endeavours to treat refugees 
recording to the standards established under refugee law. In particular, they should 
ensure the personal safety of refugees […]‖.340 These arguments do not provide 
grounds for a legally binding obligation for States to ensure the physical safety for 
refugees but they remain general values and principles. The Refugee Act does not 
contain a right to physical security, but in the section about ―Refugee women and 
children‖, it goes one step further, obliging the Commissioner for Refugee Affairs 
to ―ensure that specific measures are taken to ensure the safety of refugee 
women and children [in refugee camps].‖341 As a lot of violence and insecurity that 
occurs is gender-based and thus affects women to a greater extent, this provision is 
important and helpful. But as the Act has not yet been fully applied and lacks 
implementation in basic State duties such as the Status Determination, it is 
difficult to assert in which way the Commissioner is going to ensure the safety and 
if the measures taken will be effective. 
International human rights law provides a better framework for the relevant matter 
of security, and as shown above, the instruments apply without reservation to 
refugees and asylum seekers alike. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
includes not only a right to life, but a right to security of person,342 that became 
legally binding through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).343 Further, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights obligates its 
signatory States, including Kenya, to entitle every human being ―to respect for his 
life and the integrity of his person‖,344 and in addition guaranteeing the right to 
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security.345 For children, human rights law explicitly states their right to physical 
security in other instruments as well.346  
Thus, international human rights law includes a right to security, mostly wording it 
as the right to life, to respect of the integrity of person or simply as the right to 
personal security. As the addressees of international human rights norms are 
States, the Republic of Kenya is responsible for the physical security of all 
individuals within its territory, regardless of citizenship, thus also asylum seekers 
and refugees.347 However, it applies to freedom from State violence rather than to 
insecurity from non-State actors and today, the majority of insecurity in Kenya 
stems from individuals. In the 1990s, Kenyan security forces were the main cause 
for insecurity for refugees and asylum seekers, as the authorities often chose brutal 
repressions in order to avoid the Somali conflict from spilling into the region with 
many refugees, mostly in the camps, dying during these ―security operations‖. By 
the end of the 1990s, it was predominantly individual and non-State actors that 
accounted for the insecure situation.348  
 
During the interviews with urban refugees in Nairobi, insecurity in the camps was 
raised as one reason for the departure from the camps, especially for refugees 
originating from DRC and Ethiopia. While there is no official record of violence in 
the camps and it would probably be impossible to quantify the amount, ―incidents 
involving death and serious injury take place on a daily basis.‖349 The forms of 
insecurity in camps are multifold. In a report on the security situation in Kenyan 
camps, Jeff Crisp identifies several types of violence against refugees, although 
they are often overlapping: domestic and community violence, sexual violence, 
armed robbery, violence within national refugee groups, violence between national 
refugee groups and violence between refugees and local populations.350  
Domestic and community violence describe the fact that much of the violence 
experienced in Kakuma and Dadaab camps is inflicted upon the residents by their 
own families or communities.351 According to the report, it is common occurrence 
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that women, children and adolescents suffer violence by adults from within their 
family, although the exact scale of the problem is unknown. The justice system is 
inadequate to protect them – although the Kenyan justice system is responsible for 
the camp areas, refugee communities sometimes resort to traditional institutions 
to settle a conflict, which are in turn violent themselves, as corporal punishment 
and detention are part of some institutions.352 Also within that category falls the 
problem that refugees are sometimes recruited to fight in their countries of origin. 
For example, in 1996, about 500 people were enlisted by the Sudan People‟s 
Liberation Army (SPLA). Enlistments include forced recruitments, also of children 
and minors, and often come along with threats, harassment and violence.353 
Sexual violence, especially rape, is highly common in the camp areas. The 
overwhelming majority is experienced by female refugees, mostly in the bush 
around the camps while collecting firewood, fetching water or herding goats. It is 
likely that there is a very high number of unreported cases, as sexual violence is 
often perceived as a shameful experience and protection mechanisms are not 
adequate. From the reported incidents, however, it can be extracted that while 
some were committed by Kenyan police and refugees, the largest number of 
perpetrators are so-called ―bandits‖.354 The identities of these bandits are not well 
known – in many cases, they are composed of groups of five to fifteen men, and 
are, in Dadaab, both local Kenyans, Somali refugees and some Somali militia-
members.355 Their regular attacks contribute to a climate of fear and intimidation, 
increased by the relative impunity they seem to enjoy.356 
Armed robbery is predominantly targeted at refugees owning a business or having 
another source for cash, aid agency facilities, vehicles and mira‟a traders and is 
also ascribed to bandits. The robberies take place mostly at night and aim at cash 
and portable items, such as radios, watches or shoes; and are also ascribed to 
bandits. 
It is not surprising that violence within national refugee groups occurs in the 
camps: groups that are fighting each other in their country of origin are forced to 
live together in a limited amount of space. A negative extreme example is the 
situation of the Goma camps after the Rwandan genocide, where, instead of 
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providing a safe haven for refugees, the killings continued.357 Violence within 
national refugee groups often follows security incidents in the country of origin.358 
Moreover, marginal disputes between individuals may lead to the outbreak of 
violence along ethnic or clan lines, as happened in Kakuma in 1997, where a small 
quarrel between two youths developed into fighting between Sudanese refugees 
and left many heavily injured. ―There is an evident potential for such disputes to 
escalate into violence of a more generalized nature.‖359 Sometimes, the insecurity 
derives from governmental agents from the country of origin especially affecting 
Ethiopian refugees, including reported cases of abduction from Ethiopian agents.360 
In addition, violence between different nationalities and refugees and the local 
population happen in and around the camp areas, but on a lesser scale. Other than 
Kakuma, where there are people with varying cultural backgrounds, in Dadaab, this 
is not a heavy problem, as refugees and local populations often share the same 
language and cultures. Although there is said to be a ―persistent climate of 
suspicion‖ between refugees and the local Turkana, violent clashes are nowadays 
minimal.361 
As was seen, many of the above mentioned types of violence are gender-based. 
The most prominent example and voiced as the major concern by refugee women 
are rapes.362 They can affect every woman, from young girls to elderly women from 
all nationalities and clans, and according to some human rights activists, young 
boys (especially unaccompanied minors) are also vulnerable to experience sexual 
violence in a Kenyan refugee camp.363 Before life-fences were planted, rapes used 
to happen within the camp compounds - especially to women living without 
husbands, while as nowadays, they mostly take place in the bush surrounding the 
camps during daytime when women are searching for firewood. This knowledge, 
together with the scarcity of firewood in the region, was one reason why the GIZ 
began to distribute firewood to camp residents. Although these measures can be 
very helpful to the individual, they fight against the symptoms rather than the 
underlying causes of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). In general, SGBV 
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can be seen as a manifestation of traditional gender norms that support ―male‖ 
superiority and social norms that tolerate or justify violence against ―women‖. 
Further, poverty and high levels of crime and conflict in a society increase the 
likelihood of incidents of gender-based violence.364 Women from minority groups in 
a camp are more likely to be raped, as Fitzgerald observed in her research: ―Rape 
is a weapon of war, an act of aggression by one clan or subclan against another. 
Women who are raped are asked first to which clan or subclan they belong.‖365 
Here, the general insecurity in the camps and the lack of full implementation of 
the Kenyan legal system through numerous and trustworthy police forces and courts 
further enhance the insecurity regarding sexual and gender-based violence as 
perpetrators more often than not go unpunished.366 The protection measures at the 
camps are not enough, especially as they involve the forthcoming of the affected 
person, but rape and sexual violence are associated with shame – in fact, 
sometimes even stigmatizing women who report rape as ―rape victims‖ – and are 
thus seldom reported. The rapes are mostly perpetrated by bandits, but there are 
also numerous reports of sexual violence by security forces such as the Kenyan 
police.367 
Measures taken to address these problems include the Women Victims of Violence 
Project (WVV) from UNHCR, which aims at assisting those affected by rape. 
Although it does include many positive aspects, it has been critiqued for the 
enhancement of power relations in the camps by designating women as ―victims‖ 
instead of empowered subjects, as the title of the project already suggests.368 
 
A fact rarely mentioned in literature on insecurity in refugee camps is the violence 
that emanates from humanitarian organizations and their staff.369 ―The inhuman 
treatment accorded refugees waiting for their asylum cases to be heard or to 
receive services at the offices of UNHCR or their implementing partners has been 
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so widely reported that it can only be described as normative.‖370 Although the 
camps are legally the responsibility of the Kenyan State, they are administered by 
humanitarian organizations, which leads to an unequal power relation between 
humanitarian workers and refugees. Incidents of violence from individual 
humanitarians have been reported, including the beating of refugees, mostly as a 
means to control or ―discipline‖ refugees. But there have also been reported cases 
of collective punishment originating not only from individuals but from agency-
based decisions. For example, after a riot and the destruction of an enclosure used 
for food by refugee youths in Kakuma in 1996, the response of UNHCR was to 
impose collective punishment with food distributions being suspended for 14 days 
and incentives not paid. This was a conscious decision, as UNHCR even distributed a 
memorandum explaining the punishment.371 It has to be remembered that the 
majority of the camp residents are dependent on these food distributions and that 
it is the judicial system of Kenya that has to be applied, while UNHCR or the 
implementing partners do not have sovereignty over the camp compounds. One 
community leader formulated accurately the paternal relationship between some 
humanitarian workers and refugees: ―It is the colonial idea that some individuals 
are always children and that you have to punish them, however hardly [severely] 
and indiscriminately, because you need to educate them. After the incident was 
over and the refugees had re-built the food distribution centre, the people in the 
UN compound were saying 'The refugees have learnt the lesson, although it was a 
hard punishment'.‖372 
 
The question whether there is a right to security was answered with human rights 
law that makes personal security an obligation for States. The situation in Kenyan 
camps involves numerous violent incidents from different kind of perpetrators, 
most of them private individuals or bandits, but some from agencies and public 
services. The State is not directly responsible or accountable for these acts, but it 
has to be acknowledged that the ignorance vis-à-vis refugees accompanied by the 
missing implementation of Kenyan law and thus lawlessness in some parts of 
refugee populated areas and the situation of overcrowded, closed camps offer the 
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ideal breeding ground for insecurity and in fact are the responsibility of the Kenyan 
State.  
 
Urban refugees face different obstacles when it comes to personal security, but 
some are the same as in the camps, such as robberies, rapes and other SGBV and 
the abduction by agents from the country of origin. In Nairobi, it is well known that 
Ethiopian ―security agents‖ operate to threaten and abduct foremost politically 
active refugees and asylum seekers, with one prominent case in 1992 of a murder 
of a political leader seeking refuge in Nairobi. Insecurity is furthered by poverty 
and unsafe housing.373 Other than in the camps, personal insecurity is more often 
attributed to State officers experienced through arbitrary arrest and the problem 
of Identity Documents. 
 
3.6.2. Arbitrary Arrest and the problem with Identity Documents 
 
In an expert interview with a lawyer from Kituo cha Sheria, he asserted that the 
majority of cases they have to handle with on a daily basis concerns refugees 
having been stopped by the police and then charged with unlawful presence.374 
According to research conducted on refugees in Eastleigh, robbers and criminal 
groups posed a great security threat, but the police were named as the main 
perpetrators of violence in the community.375 As already mentioned in chapter 3.4, 
the police and their demand for bribes constitute a constant hassle for urban 
refugees. Police harassment, arbitrary arrest, corruption and violence are a 
problem for many residents of Nairobi, especially for poor people, not only 
refugees and immigrants.376 But these groups tend to be more vulnerable against a 
State force that threatens to send them back in case they do not cooperate. 
Arbitrary arrest, i.e. the arrest of someone without the likelihood that he or she 
committed an offence or without proper legal process, is clearly forbidden in 
international human rights law.377  But there have been numerous cases of the 
police in Kenya arbitrarily arresting refugees, meaning that they threaten the 
                                                 
373 Human Rights Watch 2002: 36ff.  
374 Interview with Kituo cha Sheria, 12.08.2010 
375 Pavanello/Elhawary/Pantuliano 2010: 19.  
376 Human Rights Watch 2002: 42ff. 
377 For example: Art. 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: „No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.‖ 
 89 
individual with arrest unless a bribe is paid: ―the payment of bribes has become 
the only way of avoiding arbitrary arrest and detention.‖378 If arrested, the refugee 
is taken to the police station where the possibility of a payment leads to the 
release. Otherwise, a charge will be brought into action, mostly because of 
unlawful presence in the country. Reported incidents exist numerously, an 
estimate from UNHCR stated about 2.300 in 2001, although they admitted that 
UNHCR is often not informed379 – but hardly ever a lawsuit is brought against the 
police for unlawful arrest.380 These incidents involve a big crackdown against 
Rwandan aliens in July and August 1997 – the police usually arrived in the middle of 
the night at the homes of refugees, checking identities, collecting bribes and 
taking some to the police station.381 In this case, the refugees were not released 
and after weeks in prison, most were obliged to get into buses and drive to Kakuma 
camp.382 Other big ―swoops‖ include the arrest of over 600 people, predominantly 
Somali and Ethiopians from Eastleigh, after the 1998 US embassy bombing in 
Nairobi in the following year,383384 and a group arrest in 2002, when about 800 
refugees, mostly from poor slum areas in Nairobi, were detained for days without 
indictment at the Kasarani and Gigiri Police Stations in Nairobi.385 Also, after the 
Kampala bombing in July 2010, additional arrests of predominantly Somali refugees 
took place in Nairobi and elsewhere, under the premise of national security.386 
Individuals are affected in the same way. In neighbourhoods such as Eastleigh, 
where it is known that many refugees live, police are said to routinely stop people, 
ask for their ID and then take them to the next police station. More likely to be 
stopped are Somali refugees,387 while Congolese or Ugandan try to blend into the 
Kenyan urban population of Nairobi through clothes, style and talking Swahili as 
much as possible.388  
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One reason for the chronic police harassment and arbitrary arrest is a strong 
ignorance of refugee rights and of the new Refugee Act among the police force.389 
One of UNHCR‘s objectives mentioned at interviews in Nairobi and Kakuma, is the 
education and awareness-raising of police officers in order for them to be aware of 
the meaning of being a refugee, the legal aspects it entails and to get familiar with 
refugee documentation. Today, police attitude towards refugees is mostly hostile: 
―There is a widespread belief within the police that refugees should be restricted 
to camps, and there is little understanding of the reasons why they might want to 
reside permanently in Nairobi. Police officers also typically assume that refugees 
are criminally minded, while Somalis in particular may be suspected of links with 
terrorist organizations.‖390 
 
The underlying problem is a lack of valid Identity Documents respectively the 
default of non-acceptance of the issued documents. The Refugee Act provides 
every refugee and asylum seeker with a refugee identity card or pass.391 This need 
for ID is already expressed internationally in the Refugee Convention.392 As for 
today, there is a difference between the documentation refugees enjoy and the 
papers they are acquired to have. Refugees should have a Refugee Identification 
Pass issued by the Government of Kenya, but only refugees processed before 1998 
hold them while the rest gets documents from UNHCR: 
After arriving in Kenya and presenting themselves a UNHCR office outside the 
camps, everyone will get an Appointment Letter which indicates the scheduled 
date of the Status Determination interview. Problematic with this letter is that it 
does not explicitly state that its holder is protected. As shown above, the time 
frame between the first contact with the UN and the final determination can last 
very long, mostly months or years. If the process is determined and the asylum 
seeker recognized as a refugee, he or she will get the UNHCR ―Mandate Refugee 
Certificate‖ also known as ―Protection Letter‖.393 This is an A4 size sheet of paper 
including a passport photo, the name and eventual family members and stating 
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that the holder is a refugee recognized by UNHCR. It further states whether the 
holder is required to live in a camp or can stay in Nairobi or another part of 
Kenya.394  
 
For a lot of residents at the camp, the only paper that identifies them is the ration 
card, which simply states their asylum number for UNHCR but does not include a 
photograph or name.  
 
 
         Picture 4: Ration card395 
 
It could be argued that further documentation might not be necessary, as inside 
the refugee camps the ration card is the necessary form. However, this is not only 
contradicting reality with many refugees leaving the camp compounds, but also 
against Kenya‘s own legislation, which guarantees ―every‖ refugee and asylum 
seeker an identity card or pass. Another form of documentation is available to 
camp residents: the Movement Pass. Foremost rejected as a mean to restrict 
freedom of movement, it does have the positive aspect of identifying its holder as 
a refugee who is allowed to travel outside the camp.  
However, the police routinely do not accept the ID from UNHCR presented by 
refugees or asylum seekers. Some urban refugee state that the ―protection letter is 
not worth the paper it is written on‖.396 This notion, together with other reasons 
such as long waiting periods and harassment by the police on the way to UNHCR, 
leads many asylum seekers to not apply for a regularization of their status but 
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instead to live in the city undocumented, which in turn confirms the police‘s 
attitude towards asylum seekers and refugees as being in the country unlawfully 
and illegally. Urban refugees report that their papers are either ignored or even 
torn apart when stopped, and that they then have to pay a bribe or else would be 
charged: ―Sometimes when they arrest the refugees who have the documents, they 
just throw out the document, throw it away and take them to the police station 
and then to court.‖397  
One argument sometimes raised why the IDs are not accepted is that they are not 
issued by the Kenyan government but by UNHCR that has not the sovereignty to 
either determine the refugee status nor to certificate Identity Documents which 
the Kenyan police has to accept. The reason for UNHCR to take over these tasks is 
that the Government of Kenya does not yet carry them out sufficiently. Through 
the Refugee Act and the establishment of the Department of Refugee Affairs, it is 
now also legally the task of the Government to issue Identity Documents. It has not 
yet been implemented, with some positive exceptions,398 so that up until now it is 
still UNHCR that gives out IDs. The importance of IDs has also been acknowledged 
by George Okoth-Obbo, former UNHCR Representative in Kenya: ―These cards could 
change the lives of many refugees in Kenya. We should see less intimidation, 
harassment and even arbitrary arrests of refugees.‖399 Identity Documents are also 
necessary for other areas: ―IDs are important in order to engage in financial 
matters, e.g. opening a bank account, to register at university etc. So in short, the 
refugee status and therefore the IDs enable refugees to access certain services they 
could otherwise not access.‖400 
 
Thus, valid documents are a prerequisite for refugees in order to enjoy other 
rights, such as the right to work, to health care or education. On its internet page, 
the Department of Refugee Affairs promised to begin issuing IDs, and that every 
recognized refugee is entitled to an ID within two weeks after recognition.401 The 
ID will be similar to that of Kenyan IDs instead of the A4 sheets from UNHCR that 
the police often do not accept, see picture 5.  
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Picture 5: Refugee Identity Card402 
 
In the interviews with UNHCR and the Department of Refugee Affairs, both assured 
that the ID from the Government are on the way, but until now DRA has not yet 
had enough means to implement the issuance of them. As shown, under 
international and national law, Kenyan authorities are required to guarantee IDs to 
asylum seekers and refugees. From a practical standpoint, this would mean an 
immediate improvement for the lives of many refugees, foremost for urban 
refugees, as police harassment, arbitrary arrest and the payment of bribes are 
linked to the non-acceptance of UNHCR documents.  
 
If refugees are indeed detained and the case reaches the courts, most are charged 
with ―unlawful presence‖. It is an offence under the Immigration Act to be in the 
country without a valid entry permit and the police can arrest any person 
suspected of being unlawfully present in Kenya.403 The provision then requires 
them to repatriate. However, the Refugee Act overrules this provision for every 
asylum seeker if they have already made the application for RSD, and every 
refugee.404 As already mentioned, there has been a decisive ruling by the High 
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Court of Kenya not to apply the provision of the Immigration Act as this would in 
fact constitute a breach of the principle of non-refoulement.405  
Unfortunately, most police officers and authorities are not yet aware of this legal 
difference between refugees, asylum seekers and other immigrants. Further, 
persons stopped and taken to the police station or prison may not know that their 
asylum seeker or refugee status qualifies them for immediate release.406 In these 
numerous cases, legal advice is vital, but many cannot afford a lawyer. Kituo cha 
Sheria and RCK stepped into this protection gap and now represent and advice 
detained refugees and asylum seekers – however, often there are cases that do not 
reach their office and as a result of ignorance of refugee matters, police 
harassment and lack of legal representation, the person may be sent back to his or 
her country of origin, which not only violates Kenya‘s legal obligations, but can also 
be dangerous for the individual who was fleeing the country for safety reasons in 
the first place. 
However, due to awareness raising campaigns from UNHCR and other organizations, 
the Courts are beginning to ask indicted person whether they are in Kenya for 
protection reasons: ―But normally our courts, they are cooperative in dealing with 
refugees.‖407 Mostly, they also accept the UNHCR documents and discharge them 
immediately. Some ask if the prosecuted were in fact asylum seekers, then they 
give them time to legalize the status before the case will be prosecuted.408  
 
There are reasons to be optimistic about the security hassles in town due to police 
arrests and the lack of accepted Identity Documents. Awareness raising among 
Kenyan authorities dealing with refugee matters, the promise to fully implement 
the DRA‘s task to issue governmental IDs and the ruling of Courts when dealing with 
unlawful presence of refugees and asylum seekers will help to establish these 
rights.  
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4. Mind the gap! Reasons for the disparities: some explanations 
 
The previous section gave examples for the gap409 that exists between the rights 
refugees should enjoy and the liberties they can indeed exercise. After having 
identified the most prominent violations, the aim is now to discover some of the 
reasons for them. When asking the question why the application of certain rights is 
not guaranteed, the answer will be multifold offering many factors. Some are 
political, for example the role that foreign policies or internal political quarrels 
play for refugee lives, others sociological such as the construction of refugees as 
―the other‖, therefore leaving them outside certain rights, some are economic, 
including the high unemployment rate in Kenya, limited resources of the 
government, and the endemic corruption experienced by the majority of refugees, 
further the individual level shall not be ignored and so on. All of these require a 
deep analysis in the respective field of study, and although I regard as important to 
take a look outside your discipline and acknowledge that the above mentioned 
problems are global and indeed to be considered from various angles, the attempt 
in this section is not to give a full answer to the question, but rather to follow the 
approach of the thesis analyzing the problems from a legal perspective and to offer 
certain explanations by examining the main actors involved in refugee protection, 
mainly the host State and UNHCR.  
 
4.1. The host State and UNHCR: an ambiguous relationship 
 
4.1.1. The demise of the State 
 
“No law is self-applying.”410 
 
This old legal saying gets to the heart of the dilemma of refugee rights in Kenya. 
The possibility for refugees to exercise their rights presented lies within the 
responsibility of the host State, in our case Kenya. But as the government did not 
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perform this duty the way it is legally obligated to, UNHCR stepped in and took 
over some of the pivotal roles for refugee protection. This is a development that 
can be observed not only in Kenya, but it can be identified as a general 
transformation of the role of UNHCR, without yet having adapted its mandate.  
 
The reluctance of the host State to deal with refugees is a global phenomenon, 
historically intensified when refugee admissions did not maintain their former 
political importance during the post-Cold War period.411 Most Western countries 
were setting up restrictive policies and the pronounced idea was to stem 
immigration, including refugees. As a result, the UN Convention was interpreted 
more narrowly and often, though not openly rejected, refugee rights were 
curtailed.412 Further, resettlement options were limited and funding governments 
now preferred to finance projects that coincided with these aims, such as in-
country protection. The result was that, as had already been the case before, most 
asylum seekers fled to neighbouring countries which were foremost development 
countries. This wish not to deal with asylum seekers and at best to keep them 
outside their borders was a thought that began to dominate refugee policies in 
many Asian and African countries too, including Kenya. 
But as new asylum seekers arrived at a large scale at the same time during these 
years in the 1990s, there was a huge gap in protection that UNHCR started to fill.  
 
In Kenya, this shift from State responsibility towards more decision-making power 
for UNHCR also took place at the beginning of the 1990s. Since then, the agency 
has been responsible for Status Determination and the administration of the camps, 
together with the co-decisions about who may or may not leave the camp 
compounds. Kenya declared that it was a ―transit country‖, thus enhancing the 
idea that refugees were temporary and the government did not have to deal with 
them, and even went so far as to pronounce that refugees were ―the responsibility 
of UNHCR‖.413  
The government‘s disregard towards refugees was also reflected in the lack of a 
domestic legal framework. In fact, the reluctance to implement the international 
                                                 
411 Bakircioğlu, Önder: The evolving role of the UNHCR: Should the conventional role of the UNHCR 
be expanded? In: Ankara Law Review, 2008, 5/1: 105.  
412 Slaughter, Amy/Crisp, Jeff (2009): A surrogate State? The role of UNHCR in protracted refugee 
situations. New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 168. Geneva: UNHCR: 4f.  
413 Harrell-Bond/Verdirame 2005: 272. 
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norms into the national legislation may account for many rights violations 
presented, foremost for the incidents of refoulement, the absence of the RSD 
process and the experienced insecurity. But in 2006, the Refugee Act was passed, 
thus enhancing the government‘s role in refugee protection and diminishing the 
position of UNHCR.  
 
Of the rights presented, the power shift from State to UN is relevant for the right 
to freedom of movement, to a fair and fast RSD, the right to work and equal 
payment, and security due to the camp administration and the issuance of IDs.  
 
4.1.2. The role of UNHCR 
 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was founded to assist European 
refugees fleeing from World War II, originally with a three-year mandate only. Soon 
it became clear that the agency was needed for longer and in other parts of the 
world as well, and its mandate was extended globally and prolonged ―until the 
refugee problem is solved‖.414 The original mandate was to provide ―international 
protection‖, to seek ―permanent solutions for the problem of refugees‖ and to 
―facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within 
new national communities.‖415 Thus, the concept was to promote asylum and 
guarantee the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees in regard to the UN 
Refugee Convention. 
Since its establishment, the Office has experienced many changes, due to several 
major crises such as the situations in former Yugoslavia or the Great Lakes region in 
the early 1990s. Globally, the origins of conflict changed: it was a shift from 
international clashes caused by State tensions along the Cold War lines towards 
internal conflicts and civil war. Consequently, refugee flows changed, and new and 
differing tasks were required from UNHCR that could not be found within its 
Statute – together with a dramatic expansion of its activities worldwide, in terms 
of personnel, missions and budget.416 The protection gap mentioned was beyond 
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the limits of UNHCR‘s mandate, including problems such as the plight of Internally 
Displaced Persons, humanitarian assistance, Status Determination and the 
administration of refugee camps. As the governments of the host countries were 
regularly neither willing nor able to accomplish these tasks, UNHCR took over 
pivotal elements of the host State‘s responsibility. Some argue that UNHCR also 
pressured host countries to let them carry out these central responsibilities, as 
they could generate more funds and hence considered the power shift as in the 
interest of the refugees.417 This model was often not reversed, so that in turn the 
role of the State was weakened and UNHCR‘s position strengthened.418  
Thus, an ―increasing slippage between UNHCR and state responsibilities‖419 was 
developed.  
 
Probably the most important and at the same time heavily criticized task for 
UNHCR in Kenya is the administration of the two camp complexes. When they were 
planned and constructed, the Government of Kenya had already declared that 
refugees were not its responsibility but UNHCR‘s – at the same time, some authors 
argue that UNHCR themselves lobbied for the encampment policy and its own vital 
role in it. Most likely, it was seen by both parties as in their mutual interest – 
UNHCR because they could generate more funds and protect refugees directly, and 
the government since it could get rid of the financial burden.420 While UNHCR and 
its personnel speak out vehemently against the encampment of long-term refugees, 
the problem is again that they maintain this situation of human rights violations by 
administering them and comply with the idea that camps are inevitable.421 As an 
example, it was UNHCR that organized the buses to transport refugees to camps 
involuntarily, escorted by the police, after a round-up in 1997.422 The position of 
UNHCR on encampment is also reflected in their urban refugees policies, which 
until recently called refugees outside camps ―irregular movers‖ who belonged into 
camps,423 enhancing the insecure situation of many urban refugees.  
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A further point of critique of UNHCR‘s role in Kenya is the insistence they put on 
repatriation to the country of origin as the preferred option for refugees. This is in 
compliance with the government‘s position, which considers refugees as being in 
the country temporarily. That this policy is far from reality has been shown. 
Therefore, integration into the local communities, including enhanced rights such 
as employment and free choice of residence, were sidelined.424 
 
A contributing factor to the gap between rights in the books and on the ground are 
the ―care and maintenance programmes‖ that UNHCR has advanced since the 
1980s. Following this model, UNHCR offers services to refugees and asylum seekers 
separate from public services, such as education, health facilities, sanitation and 
even access to food.425 These are often better equipped than the services available 
locally, thus contributing to the tension between host and refugee populations and 
increasing insecurity. Additionally, the idea of encampment and the consequences 
it brings along, such as restrictions on the freedom of movement and choice of 
residence or the right to work, present quick relief but do not put forward long-
term solutions such as integration into the host society and self-sufficiency. 
Moreover, they further enhance the role UNHCR plays, making it inevitable for 
refugees to address the agency, and thus diminishing the role of the State. In turn, 
this approach is highly reliant on outside funds, mostly originating from donor 
countries. The opposite concept is found in the rights-based approach. It works 
upon the assumption that refugees, such as all human beings, are entitled to 
certain rights.426 In following these rights, durable solutions will ultimately be 
found, thus refugees protected and asylum promoted. Goodwin-Gill has argued that 
the ―portion of UNHCR protection work that was rooted in international law, 
standards and principles, has been eclipsed by so-called pragmatic approaches to 
refugee problems, in which everything seems to be negotiable.‖427  
These differing approaches led to a conflict between quick relief and durable, 
rights-based protection. This conflict is also present within the agency‘s priorities 
between humanitarian assistance and the promotion of asylum: While the original 
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aim was to be a strong moral authority in ensuring the rights of forced migrants, 
humanitarian emergencies opened up through mass movements that the 
responsible governments were not tackling adequately, and UNHCR undertook at 
the expense of guaranteeing civil and social rights.  
 
To summarize, the role of UNHCR shifted from its original mandate to promote 
asylum, which is still valid today, to a variety of new tasks formerly the 
responsibility of the host State. In an article about this development, Amy 
Slaughter calls UNHCR a ―surrogate State‖, accurately describing its difficult role. 
The problem with the expansion is first the imprecise legal framework for the new 
tasks – States hold international responsibilities for their actions, but as UNHCR is 
not a State and not party to central treaties and Conventions, it is not subjected to 
international law the way States are. UNHCR is often exercising sovereignty, for 
example in the refugee camps or through RSD, but is merely a guest in the country 
of asylum.428 Secondly, UNHCR uses its funds, influence and personnel working for 
the new duties, while compromising its role as an advocate of refugees and their 
rights. Initially, UNHCR was considered a moral authority for refugee protection, 
criticizing the misbehaviour of governments and demanding them to respect their 
international obligations. But this role cannot be upheld if they themselves take 
part in decisions and situations that some perceive as a violation of refugee rights, 
such as the confinement of refugees to camps. To conclude, ―it is precisely the 
agency‘s involvement in vaguely defined humanitarian activities that has diluted its 
role as the main international actor responsible for promoting asylum.‖429 
Thus, while it seemed as the most logical step for UNHCR to fill the gaps the State 
left, this paper argues that this has proven to be counter-productive. By supporting 
the encampment policy and even deciding who is allowed to leave the compounds, 
thus following an approach that renders refugees dependent in a protracted 
situation like the one in Kenya, UNHCR is turning away from its original activities to 
promote asylum and pursue a rights-based approach.  
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4.2. The plurality of the Refugee Status 
 
4.2.1. RSD: a further responsibility of UNHCR 
 
The status is essential for refugee protection, because many instruments, such as 
the right to work, are linked to a regularized stay in the country of asylum. 
Problematic in this regard is that in practice there is more than one refugee status 
and the respective rights the different ―statuses‖ entail remain uncertain. 
Until today, UNHCR is responsible for RSD in Kenya, although the Department of 
Refugee Affairs has promised to take over this task. It is only a State than can 
provide someone with the refugee status. Therefore, as was shown, the agency can 
only grant a so-called ―Mandate status‖, meaning that UNHCR offers protection 
under its mandate. The consequence is that this legal status is not clearly defined, 
as host States do not have to accept a refugee status granted by a UN agency. In 
Kenya, this uncertainty of the status leads to security problems due to Identity 
Documents: it is UNHCR that has so far given out IDs, not the Government of 
Kenya, and these are regularly not accepted by the police and authorities, thus 
leading to insecurity for refugees. Further, while in many countries the agency 
represents rejected asylum seekers and advocates on their behalf, thus promoting 
asylum, this cannot be done when UNHCR is the decision-making body. Other NGOs 
were founded during the last years to take up these challenges, often supporting 
court cases against UNHCR decisions. This clearly indicates the shift and the 
problems that it includes. Therefore, the role of UNHCR in Kenya can be seen as 
one reason for the inadequate standards in RSD and security. 
 
4.2.2. Prima facie status: a legal anomaly responsible for the lack of protection? 
 
Connected to the role of UNHCR and its position in RSD is the prima facie status 
that the Office grants to certain asylum seekers as a group, presenting a legal 
category difficult to grasp. Asylum seekers from Somalia and Darfur do not undergo 
individual Refugee Status Determination procedures, but are granted refugee status 
on a prima facie basis. Despite its widespread use, it remains unclear what this 
status entails and which rights these refugees enjoy as compared to refugees that 
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have undergone an individual screening. In this chapter, it will be examined 
whether the use of this status can be seen as a reason for the gap in rights. 
 
A temporary status for an indefinite time 
The necessity for a prima facie determination of refugees arises when a large 
amount of people seeking refuge arrive during a short period of time. It is used in 
the following scenario: a State‘s capacity to conduct individual RSD is surpassed, 
mostly because of a large scale influx. In order not to close the borders or to allow 
anyone to enter the country unregistered, prima facie is granted as a refugee 
status to all people that arrive from a certain place during a certain period.430 It 
principally follows the idea that as long as there is no evidence to the contrary, 
these asylum seekers will be regarded as refugees, while usually it is the other way 
around.  
 
In Kenya, UNHCR began conducting this procedure as soon as it took over the RSD in 
the 1990s, due to the rapid and large influx of asylum seekers.431 At the time, the 
prima facie status did not have any legal source as no refugee law had been 
established on the domestic level. That did not keep the Kenyan authorities and 
UNHCR to allow refugees to reside inside the country on a prima facie status, 
limited to the newly established refugee camps.432 Their legal status, however, 
remained unclear. Today, asylum seekers from Somalia and Darfur are granted 
prima facie status without undergoing individual status determination, due to the 
large number of Somali and Darfurian migrants and the high likelihood that they 
are indeed refugees because of the dangerous situation in these regions – 
previously Southern Sudanese had been included, but due to positive political 
changes in the country, they now require individual RSD.433   
―In the absence of international instruments providing for standards of recognition 
of refugees on a prima facie basis, States have devised their own procedures under 
national legislation and State practice.‖434 Kenya was one of the first African 
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countries that amended domestic legislation on the prima facie status through the 
implementation of the Refugee Act in 2006.435 
 
In search for a legal foundation 
Are prima facie refugees legally refugees? The status and the rights attached are 
heavily discussed in literature on international refugee law.436 To answer this 
question, there are two schools of thought:437 One opinion, mainly held by Okoth-
Obbo, highlights the provisional character of the status and the presumption that 
comes with it. He states that it is a temporary concept that considers a person a 
refugee without completing the individual RSD. ―Persons assisted under the prima 
facie framework still await the conclusive determination of their refugee status no 
less than an asylum-seeker awaiting adjudication before a tribunal.‖438 According 
to this opinion, this status is not per se a refugee status, as all the asylum seekers 
granted prima facie will undergo an individual procedure once the State gets hold 
of the large-scale influx that led to the use of the prima facie status. It will then 
be replaced with an individual status determination procedure, with the result of 
rejection or the refugee status after the UN Convention. However, in practice, the 
―temporary‖ prima facie status will often stay unchanged for years or not be 
reversed at all.439 
The second school of thought is based on the idea that forced migrants having been 
determined on a prima facie basis are indeed refugees and enjoy the same rights as 
anyone individually processed: ―Determination that a group is prima facie a 
refugee group, raises a presumption that the individual members of the group are 
refugees. As such, they can benefit from the international protection and 
assistance extended to them by UNHCR, on behalf of the international 
community.‖440 
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To conclude which position is more adequate, an overview over the legal 
foundations and the historical employment of the prima facie status are necessary.   
 
The term prima facie originates from the law of evidence, where it is essentially 
used to allocate the burden of proof.441 It cannot be found in the UN Refugee 
Convention, nor the OAU Convention or any other legally binding document in 
international refugee law.442 Nevertheless, it has been used and is still used in 
several countries regarding forced migrants. Historically for the first time, it was in 
1956 with the massive flight of Hungarians to Austria that the need for a group 
determination was expressed.443 UNHCR justified the use of the Refugee 
Convention for prima facie refugees: The Austrian authorities ―are prepared to 
consider the Hungarian refugees in Austria to be within the scope of the UN 
Refugee Convention and to issue them with a normal eligibility certificate to this 
effect as soon as it is technically possible.‖444 This favours Jackson‘s interpretation 
of prima facie refugees as falling within the scope of the Convention, thus not 
having a temporary, but indeed a valid refugee status. 
Contrary to its widespread use over time, international refugee law is silent on the 
matter of prima facie on both how it may be defined and what it implies. But 
despite its lack of legal foundation, ―prima facie determination has become 
common if not consistent practice for mass movements of refugees in Africa.‖445 
 
Limited standards of protection for prima facie refugees? 
―What are the standards of treatment which prima facie refugees are entitled to? 
Are these standards different from those applicable to refugees recognized on 
individual basis?‖446 The main question in terms of prima facie refugees is whether 
they are granted different, sub-standard protection compared to ―regular‖ 
refugees – thus, if the status can be used as an explanation for the gap in rights.  
No matter which school of thought you follow, prima facie refugees are refugees, 
therefore entitled to every single one of the described rights. However, during a 
situation of large-scale influx of asylum seekers, UNHCR has begun to classify rights 
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into different categories: from the most basic rights, namely the principle of non-
refoulement and rights necessary to ensure immediate physical survival, to rights 
said to be more elaborate, such as the right to work, to identity papers or travel 
documents.447 This categorization is nowhere provided for in law, and it further 
works on the assumption that all rights will gradually be included after the 
emergency situation of the mass influx - this has not been done in Kenya. 
Although theoretically, the prima facie status does not imply any limitations, in 
practice there is a difference between Convention or statutory refugees and prima 
facie refugees: ―Because of the discretionary application of prima facie status, this 
move has allowed for a politicization of refugee determination processes and the 
gradual institutionalization of weaker standards of refugee status.‖448 Hyndman and 
Nylund elaborate that Kenya resorted to this status in order to avoid having to 
grant full rights to all asylum seekers, arguing that ―the human rights of refugees in 
Kenya are being exchanged for their temporary asylum in camps.‖449 This is made 
possible by the lack of a clear definition or legal foundation in international law. 
Contrary to this view, the interviewees did not consider the application of the 
prima facie status per se as a reason for limited rights. Foremost because the 
limitations, for example the requirement to stay in camps, the non-issuance of 
work permits or the insecurity experienced is not linked to the prima facie status, 
but to the situation of all refugees, regardless of their status. 
To conclude, although the prima facie status further enhances the confusion about 
the legal status and what it entails, it cannot serve as an answer to the question 
whether it is responsible for the gap in rights.  
 
In this chapter it was shown that there is no simple answer as to why forced 
migrants in Kenya do not enjoy the rights they are legally entitled to. Rather, the 
reasons are a combination of legal and non-legal factors, most notably the 
ambiguous role of UNHCR and the Government of Kenya and the lack of 
understanding of the refugee status.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
Question: If you had the power, what would you change for refugees in Kenya? 
Answer: I think as per what was implemented in international human right laws, we 
should give refugees the opportunities of the laws that are already in place. It‟s 
like these laws and policies were just mentioned and written in sample books and 
archives, but they were not implemented.450 
 
In the course of this paper, several hypotheses have been presented. The principal 
hypotheses, regarding whether or not refugees are able to enjoy their basic human 
and refugee rights in Kenya, has shown to be partly true. There is indeed a 
discrepancy between theory and practice: although Kenya has ratified the relevant 
international protection regime, there is a considerable lack of its execution.  
For the international principle of non-refoulement it can be acknowledged that 
there have been incidents, foremost in the past due to the closure of the border 
with Somalia. However, this right is mostly adhered to. 
Further, the State does not perform its duty to determine the refugee status of 
asylum seekers, but rather leaves this responsibility to UNHCR. Therefore, the RSD 
process contains several problems, including long waiting periods and inadequate 
procedures to appeal. 
Many of these legal problems can be directly linked to the poor implementation of 
the freedom to move: refugees are required to stay in camps indefinitely. Although 
the majority indeed lives in two large camp complexes in the periphery of Kenya, 
many choose to stay outside these areas and therefore face various other 
obstacles.  
One of these is the poor implementation of the right to employment, which is 
neither met in the camps nor for urban refugees. In camps, a legally unknown 
system of ―incentives‖ instead of payment has been developed, creating further 
problems regarding equal pay. Therefore, refugees gain their major revenue from 
informal work. Further, insecurity and violence is a daily concern for many 
refugees, often linked to lacking identity documents and police harassment. 
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The reasons for the gap between these theoretical and practical rights can be 
found in the ambivalent role of UNHCR and the confusion about what the refugee 
status entails. 
 
Although the paper has a clear focus on Kenya, the analysis and conclusions are 
equally true for many other countries – African and worldwide. Globally, a more 
restrictive climate for immigrants - including refugees - can be observed and similar 
conclusions can be drawn for the majority of countries dealing with a large number 
of asylum seekers and refugees.  
 
However, for Kenya, positive closing words are in place:  
―In a nutshell, I think, well, there have been steps that have been made towards 
protecting the rights of refugees, but there‘s still a lot to be done.‖451 
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7. Abstract 
 
Refugees in Kenya cannot fully enjoy the rights they are entitled to. The 
discrepancy between refugee and human rights in theory and practice are analysed 
through some selected rights, including the principle of non-refoulement, the 
Refugee Status Determination process, the freedom to move and choose a place of 
residence, the right to work and security rights.  
 
The country has ratified the essential international Conventions and treaties - 
namely the Refugee Convention and Protocol, the Convention of the former 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the International Bill on Human Rights. 
Through the Refugee Act, the first national legal framework concerning refugees, 
refugees are now entitled to most of the above mentioned rights, but these have 
not yet been fully implemented.  
In practice, refugees are obliged to stay in two major and remote refugee camps, 
Kakuma and Dadaab, and are only allowed to leave under certain circumstances, 
with the joint permission from the government and UNHCR. Nevertheless, many 
choose to live outside these areas and face various challenges due to this 
irregularity. These include police harassment and a general situation of physical 
insecurity, which is also experienced in the camps. Although refugees both in the 
camps and urban refugees have the right to work, they are hardly ever granted the 
work permission needed and hence resort to other forms of income, mainly in the 
informal economy.  
 
Reasons for this discrepancy between theory and practice can be found in the 
inactivity of the State towards refugees and the therefore ambiguous role of 
UNHCR, which carries out many of these State responsibilities, for example the 
administration of the refugee camps. Another possible explanation lies in the 
application of a prima facie status and the confusion about which rights the 
refugee status contains.  
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8. Zusammenfassung 
 
Es gibt eine Diskrepanz zwischen der Situation von Flüchtlingen in Kenia und ihren 
international festgelegten Rechten. Diese wird anhand einiger ausgewählter Rechte 
– darunter das Prinzip des Non-Refoulement, dem Aufbau des Asylverfahrens, die 
Bewegungsfreiheit, das Recht auf Arbeit und einem eventuellen Recht auf 
Sicherheit – untersucht.   
 
Kenia hat die zentralen internationale Abkommen zu Flüchtlings- und 
Menschenrechten unterschrieben und ratifiziert. Diese umfassen vor allem die 
Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention,  OAU Flüchtlingskonvention und die Allgemeine 
Erklärung der Menschenrechte, sowie Zivilpakt und Sozialpakt. Weiters wurde auf 
nationaler Ebene der Refugee Act erlassen, der erstmals Rechte und Pflichten von 
Flüchtlingen festlegt. Da diese Abkommen sämtliche genannten Rechte 
garantieren, stehen diese Rechte allen Flüchtlingen in Kenia zu. 
Dieser theoretische Anspruch korreliert jedoch nicht mit der Umsetzung: 
Flüchtlinge sind verpflichtet, in einem der beiden abgelegenen Flüchtlingslagern 
Kakuma oder Dadaab zu leben, und können diese nur mit einer Genehmigung auf 
kurze Zeit verlassen. Trotz dieser Einschränkung entscheiden sich viele dazu, 
außerhalb der Lager zu leben und sehen sich deshalb mit weiteren Schwierigkeiten, 
wie etwa polizeilicher Willkür, konfrontiert. Obwohl Flüchtlingen sowohl in der 
Stadt als auch in den Camps das Recht zu arbeiten zusteht, wird die dafür nötige 
Arbeitsbewilligung nur selten gewährt, sodass sich die meisten anderer 
Einnahmequellen, überwiegend im informellen Sektor, bedienen. 
 
Gründe für den Unterschied zwischen den theoretischen Rechte und ihrer 
praktischen Umsetzung ergeben sich daraus, dass die Regierung ihren 
internationalen Verpflichtungen bezüglichen Flüchtlingen nur spärlich nachkommt, 
weshalb UNHCR diese übernimmt, wie beispielsweise die Leitung der 
Flüchtlingslager. Weiters ist der Flüchtlingsstatus und welche Rechte er impliziert 
oft unklar, was durch die Verwendung der undurchsichtigen Kategorie Prima Facie 
Flüchtlinge noch verstärkt wird.    
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